FBI-Election-Interference-Report-FINAL--10-30-24-.pdf

FBI-Election-Interference-Report-FINAL--10-30-24-.pdf

• 1. ELECTION INTERFERENCE: HOW THE FBI “PREBUNKED” A TRUE STORY ABOUT THE BIDEN FAMILY’S CORRUPTION IN ADVANCE OF THE 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Interim Staff Report of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government U.S. House of Representatives October 30, 2024

• 2. 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY “But, when we get hauled up to [Capitol] hill to testify on why we influenced the 2020 elections we can say we have been meeting for YEARS with USG [U.S. Government] to plan for it.” —July 15, 2020, 3:17 p.m. ET, internal Facebook message during Facebook’s meeting with the FBI and other agencies. 1 At 5:00 a.m. ET, on Wednesday, October 14, 2020, less than three weeks before the 2020 presidential election, the New York Post published a potentially election-altering news story about a years-long influence peddling scheme carried out by the family of the Democratic nominee for president, former Vice President Joe Biden. 2 The Post article detailed how Hunter Biden leveraged his famous last name to provide foreign officials with access to his father in exchange for the Biden family’s significant financial gain.3 This information was recovered from the hard drive of a laptop attributed to Hunter Biden, and the article included pictures of a signed federal subpoena, demonstrating that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had seized that hard drive.4 Neither Hunter Biden nor the Biden presidential campaign denied the allegations or the provenance of the laptop; indeed, the Biden Department of Justice (DOJ) has since authenticated the laptop as evidence in federal court. 5 Soon after the Post article was published, however, something strange happened. Almost immediately, major social media platforms, including Twitter and Facebook—the modern-day digital town square—censored the true story about Biden family influence peddling. As a consequence, millions of Americans cast their presidential vote unaware of serious, credible allegations of misconduct levied against one of the two candidates. This censorship served to benefit one candidate over the other and wrongfully affected the 2020 election.6 Today, these companies and their executives belatedly admit that their censorship was wrong.7 Why were the social media companies so ready to censor a true story about Hunter Biden featured in a prominent American newspaper? Because the FBI had primed them for it. For nearly a year, the FBI had been conditioning social media companies to expect a “hack-andleak” operation from Russia involving Hunter Biden. In more than thirty meetings across eight 1 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (July 15, 2020, 3:17 p.m.), see Ex. 10. 2 See Emma-Jo Morris & Gabrielle Fonrouge, Smoking-gun email reveals how Hunter Biden introduced Ukrainian businessman to VP dad, N.Y. POST (Oct. 14, 2020). 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 James Lynch, Prosecution Introduces Hunter Biden’s Infamous Laptop at Trial, Uses Data as Evidence of Crack Addiction, NAT. REVIEW (June 4, 2024). 6 See, e.g., Rich Noyes, SPECIAL REPORT: The Stealing of the Presidency, 2020, MEDIA RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 24, 2020) (“Even more Biden voters (45.1%) said they were unaware of the financial scandal enveloping Biden and his son, Hunter . . . . According to our poll, full awareness of the Hunter Biden scandal would have led 9.4% of Biden voters to abandon the Democratic candidate[.]”). 7 Letter from Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Meta, to Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Aug. 26, 2024) (“[W]e shouldn’t have demoted the [New York Post] story.”); Transcribed Interview of Nick Clegg, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 1, 2024) (on file with Comm.); Transcribed Interview of Yoel Roth, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 1, 2023) (on file with Comm.).

• 3. 2 months, the FBI led Big Tech to believe that the allegations in the Post story were Russian disinformation, even though the FBI had authenticated Hunter Biden’s laptop nearly a year prior. 8 Beginning in early 2020, the FBI embarked on a concerted campaign to preemptively debunk—or “prebunk”—allegations about the Biden family’s influence peddling. Federal agencies repeatedly warned social media platforms about a pre-election Russian influence operation relating to Hunter Biden and the Ukrainian company Burisma.9In many of these meetings between federal agencies and Big Tech, the FBI raised the topic of potential “hack-andleak” operations amid conversations about “election security” and potential foreign influence operations.10 In response, some platforms even adopted new content moderation policies specifically designed to address hacked materials. 11 Then, when the Post reported on Biden family influence peddling the morning of October 14, 2020, Big Tech did exactly what it had been primed to do. The social media companies obediently treated the article as a potential Russian hack-and-leak operation and applied their content moderation policies to censor it, prevent it from spreading, and hide it from the American people. 12 Of course, as was obvious then and as is widely acknowledged now,13 the laptop was real and its contents were authentic. It was not Russian disinformation. The FBI knew this, too—it had been in possession of Hunter Biden’s laptop since late 2019 and used it in one or more ongoing investigations in 2020.14 Indeed, in June 2024, the Justice Department used content from the laptop as evidence against Hunter Biden in his trial for felony gun crimes.15 And yet, the FBI not only primed the social media companies to distrust allegations about Biden family influence peddling in advance, it misled social media companies about the authenticity of Hunter Biden’s laptop after the Post story broke. 16 The FBI’s duplicity notwithstanding, Big Tech companies bear blame as well. Contemporaneous documents from the relevant period show that social media companies 8 See infra Section II.B; Transcribed Interview of Gary Shapley, H. Comm. on Ways and Means (May 26, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 12. 9 See infra Section II.C. 10 Id. 11 See infra Section II.D. 12 See infra Section III. 13 See, e.g., Letter from Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Meta, to Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Aug. 26, 2024) (“[T]he reporting was not Russian disinformation[.]”); Marshall Cohen & Holmes Lybrand, Special counsel plans to use infamous Hunter Biden laptop as evidence at gun trial, CNN (May 22, 2024); Ingrid Jacques, Trump right about Hunter’s ‘laptop from hell,’ though Biden claimed Russian disinformation, USA TODAY (June 6, 2024). 14 Transcribed Interview of Gary Shapley, H. Comm. on Ways and Means (May 26, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 12. 15 Ryan King et al., Hunter Biden gun trial jurors shown infamous laptop first exposed by The Post in dramatic courtroom reveal, N.Y. POST (June 4, 2024); see also Josh Christenson, Video of Dems, media rejecting Post’s Hunter Biden laptop story as ‘Russian disinfo’ goes viral after FBI confirms authenticity in court, N.Y. POST (June 6, 2024). 16 See infra Section III.

• 4. 3 recognized and received information that the Biden family influence peddling allegations were likely not Russian disinformation; 17 nonetheless senior leadership at these companies decided to take steps to hide this true content highly relevant to the upcoming presidential election because they knew a failure to censor the story could affect how a potential incoming Biden-Harris Administration would treat them. 18 “Obviously, our calls on this could colour the way an incoming Biden administration views us more than almost anything else…” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal messages between Facebook’s then-Vice President of Global Affairs Nick Clegg to Vice President of Global Public Policy Joel Kaplan about Facebook’s censorship of the New York Post article The Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government have been conducting oversight of how and to what extent the Executive Branch has coerced or colluded with companies and other intermediaries to censor lawful speech.19 Through a series of reports, the Committee and Select Subcommittee have revealed how the Executive Branch worked with social media companies, “disinformation” pseudoscientists, and others to censor Americans’ online speech.20 This interim report focuses on the coordination between the FBI and Big Tech to suppress allegations about Biden family influence peddling in advance of the 2020 election. Testimony from key FBI and Big Tech personnel and subpoenaed nonpublic internal documents and communications obtained by the Committee and Select Subcommittee show that in the months before the election, the FBI provided social media companies with specific warnings: 17 See, e.g., infra Section III.B.3. 18 Messages between Nick Clegg and Joel Kaplan (Oct. 14, 2020), see Ex. 101. 19 See Ryan Tracy, Facebook Bowed to White House Pressure, Removed Covid Posts, WALL ST. J. (July 28, 2023). 20 See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 118TH CONG., THE CENSORSHIP-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW TOP BIDEN WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS COERCED BIG TECH TO CENSOR AMERICANS, TRUE INFORMATION, AND CRITICS OF THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION (Comm. Print May 1, 2024); STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND THE SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 118TH CONG., THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION: HOW NSF IS FUNDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOMATED TOOLS TO CENSOR ONLINE SPEECH “AT SCALE” AND TRYING TO COVER UP ITS ACTIONS (Comm. Print Feb. 5, 2024); STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND THE SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 118TH CONG., THE WEAPONIZATION OF ‘DISINFORMATION’ PSEUDO-EXPERTS AND BUREAUCRATS: HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PARTNERED WITH UNIVERSITIES TO CENSOR AMERICANS’ POLITICAL SPEECH (Comm. Print Nov. 6, 2023); STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND THE SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 118TH CONG., THE FBI’S COLLABORATION WITH A COMPROMISED UKRAINIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO CENSOR AMERICAN SPEECH (Comm. Print July 10, 2023); STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND THE SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 118TH CONG., THE WEAPONIZATION OF CISA: HOW A “CYBERSECURITY” AGENCY COLLUDED WITH BIG TECH AND “DISINFORMATION” PARTNERS TO CENSOR AMERICANS (Comm. Print June 26, 2023).

• 5. 4 • WHO: Russia. The FBI repeatedly warned Big Tech of a potential influence operation by Russian actors targeting the 2020 election.21 • WHAT: A hack-and-leak operation. The FBI repeatedly warned Big Tech that the Russian influence operation would likely take the form of a hack and leak, similar to the leak of Democratic National Committee emails in 2016.22 • WHEN: Late September or October 2020. The FBI repeatedly warned Big Tech that this hack-and-leak operation would come right before the election, either as “an October surprise” 23 or “as soon as the first Presidential debate on September 29th.”24 • WHY: To reveal “evidence” regarding “links between the Biden family and Ukraine,” including “Burisma.” The FBI warned Big Tech that the Russian hack-and-leak operation would likely involve “real or manufactured evidence concerning links between the Biden family and Ukraine, including the oil company Burisma.” 25 Internal Microsoft notes state that a “week” before the New York Post story broke on October 14, the “FBI tipped [Big Tech] off” that “this Burisma story was likely to emerge.” 26 “USG partners . . . believe there is a risk of a hack/leak operation . . . likely involving . . . evidence concerning links between the Biden family and Ukraine, including the oil company Burisma.” —Sept. 21, 2020 internal Facebook email to senior Facebook executives 21 Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:04 p.m.), see Ex. 1; Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 21-25. 22 Id. 23 Internal message from Facebook personnel to Nick Clegg (Oct. 15, 2020, 9:29 a.m.), see Ex. 2. 24 Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:04 p.m.), see Ex. 1. 25 Id. 26 Microsoft internal meeting notes (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:27 p.m.), see Ex. 3.

• 6. 5 “FBI tipped us all off last week that this Burisma story was likely to emerge” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal Microsoft notes on meeting between U.S. government and Big Tech As documents produced to the Committee and the Select Subcommittee show, the U.S. government—particularly the FBI, while in possession of Hunter Biden’s laptop—provided detailed warnings of an anticipated future Russian influence operation that directly mirrored the contents of the laptop.27 Documents and testimony also reveal that FBI personnel who were part of the FBI task force providing these warnings knew that the laptop was real prior to the release of the New York Post story.28 Armed with evidence of Biden family corruption, the FBI worked for months to ensure that when this evidence emerged in the public sphere, Big Tech would be ready to downplay and censor it. Big Tech’s immediate reactions to the October 14 Post story confirm how the companies were primed by the FBI’s months-long prebunking efforts. For example, internal Facebook communications show that the company almost immediately deemed the story to be a “hack/leak” of the sort Facebook was “expect[ing].” 29 On the morning of October 14, Facebook employees exchanged candid communications about the story, including: • 8:37 AM ET: “About what we expected in the hack/leak department […] it’s pretty much exactly what we pregamed.” 30 • 8:42 AM ET: “It looks like exactly the hack/leak scenario we’d expected.” 31 • 9:06 AM ET: “Can we check with FBI Delaware if they have anything [on] this […] Article claims that FBI has had the HDD [hard drive] since December.” 32 27 See infra Section II.C. 28 See infra Section II.A. 29 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 8:37 a.m.), see Ex. 4. 30 Id. 31 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 8:42 a.m.), see Ex. 5. 32 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:06 a.m.), see Ex. 6.

• 7. 6 • 9:09 AM ET: “Exact content expected for hack and leak.” 33 • 9:10 AM ET: “Right on schedule.” 34 • 9:14 AM ET: “[Facebook employee] is not in touch with the FBI on this. I’ll connect with Maryland and [Facebook employee] will raise at the [FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force] meeting today.” 35 • 9:33 AM ET: “FYI. Our legal team is reaching out to FBI on this.” 36 • 10:40 AM ET: “We’re enqueuing the content with demotion and doing outreach to 3PFCs [third-party factcheckers]. No updated info from FBI, no outreach from the Biden campaign.” 37 • 10:55 AM ET: “is this the Oct surprise everyone was waiting for?” 38 “It looks like exactly the hack/leak scenario we’d expected” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal messages among Facebook personnel Other documents suggest that key employees within the social media companies understood how their censorship would influence the election. Before the story broke, Facebook personnel understood that their response to an alleged hack and leak could sway the presidential election: in a July 2020 internal exchange, a member of Facebook’s Trust and Safety team said that “when we get hauled up to the hill to testify on why we influenced the 2020 elections we can say we have been meeting for YEARS with [the U.S. Government] to plan for it.”39 Nothing had 33 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:09 a.m.), see Ex. 7. 34 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:10 a.m.), see Ex. 7. 35 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:14 a.m.), see Ex. 6. 36 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:33 a.m.), see Ex. 8. 37 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 10:40 a.m.), see Ex. 7. 38 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 10:55 a.m.), see Ex. 107. 39 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (July 15, 2020, 3:17 p.m.), see Ex. 10.

• 8. 7 changed by the time the story broke on October 14: the Head of Electoral and Emerging Risk for Facebook’s Trust and Safety reacted by noting that it was only “482 hours to first polls close.” 40 “But, when we get hauled up to the hill to testify on why we influenced the 2020 elections we can say we have been meeting for YEARS with USG [the U.S. Government] to plan for it.” —July 15, 2020, internal messages among Facebook personnel The FBI has defended its actions as information exchange with private-sector partners to prevent amorphous “foreign malign influence” operations.41 But if the FBI’s intent was truly to help social media companies combat actual foreign influence operations, the FBI should have shared the single most important fact: the influence-peddling allegations in the Post story were based off of real, credible information, including information in the FBI’s possession. The FBI failed to do so. While the FBI eventually conceded that it had no indication that the allegations in the Post story were Russian disinformation—only after an FBI agent mistakenly revealed to Twitter that the laptop was “real”—the FBI still withheld the fact that it had seized and authenticated Hunter Biden’s laptop months prior. 42 As a result, Twitter and Facebook continued to censor the most significant news story of the election cycle, limiting the reach of allegations of Biden family corruption and ultimately benefitting the Biden-Harris campaign.43 Twitter suppressed the Post story by removing links to 40 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 11:11 a.m.), see Ex. 9. 41 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 24-080, EVALUATION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S EFFORTS TO COORDINATE INFORMATION SHARING ABOUT FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE THREATS TO U.S. ELECTIONS (July 2024) at 7. 42 Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.), at 83-85. 43 Messages between Nick Clegg and Joel Kaplan (Oct. 14, 2020), see Ex. 101.

• 9. 8 it, applying “safety” warnings, and blocking the ability to send it via direct message.44 Although Twitter lifted the ban on the story the next day, it continued to suspend the Post’s account until October 30.45 For a week, Facebook manually demoted the content by 50 percent, substantially reducing the likelihood that users would see it in their feed. 46 During this week, over 30 million Americans cast their votes in the 2020 election—nearly one-fifth of the final vote total, and far more than the final reported margin of forty-five thousand votes that determined the outcome of the election. 47 * * * The roots of the FBI’s 2020 prebunking scheme date back to the 2016 presidential election, after which emerged sensationalized accounts that foreign “disinformation” had affected the integrity of the election. Fueled by left-wing election denialism, a cottage industry of pseudoscientists, think tanks, and university centers sprung up to combat the alleged rise in misinformation and disinformation, which they held responsible for President Trump’s victory. The FBI formed the Foreign Influence Task Force to coordinate with social media companies and prevent alleged foreign disinformation from reaching American voters. These entities worked together and with social media companies to censor speech—disproportionately conservative speech—all in the name of stopping disinformation and, ironically enough, promoting democracy. The FBI’s prebunking of allegations of Biden family influence peddling in the closing weeks of the 2020 presidential election was merely a continuation of its earlier efforts to stop President Trump. This is the same FBI that abused its foreign surveillance authorities to spy on President Trump’s campaign in 2016. 48 This is the same FBI that fabricated evidence to support warrantless surveillance on a Trump campaign associate.49 This is the same FBI where senior officials bragged about an “insurance plan” to prevent Donald Trump from becoming president and promised each other they would “stop” him.50 This is the same FBI that has purged conservative agents from its ranks and asked employees whether their colleagues are supporters 44 Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X (Dec. 2, 2022, 6:34 p.m.), https://x.com/mtaibbi/status/1598822959866683394. 45 Bruce Golding, How tweet it is: Twitter backs down, unlocks Post’s account, N.Y. POST (Oct. 30, 2020). 46 Transcribed Interview of Nick Clegg, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 1, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 117; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 11:05 a.m.), see Ex. 7; see also Messages between Nick Clegg and Joel Kaplan (Oct. 14, 2020), Ex. 101. 47 See Brittany Renee Mayes et al., The U.S. hit 73% of 2016 voting before Election Day, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2020); Catherine Park, More than 14M Americans have voted early in 2020 presidential election, data shows, FOX 10 PHOENIX (Oct. 14, 2020); James M. Lindsay, The 2020 Election by the Numbers, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Dec. 15, 2020); Paul Waldman, We came much closer to an election catastrophe than many realize, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2020). 48 See Bill Rivers, FBI abuses in domestic surveillance of the Trump campaign eerily echo Red Scare raids, NBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2020); Trump Really Was Spied On, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2022). 49 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Conn., FBI Attorney Admits Altering Email Used for FISA Application During “Crossfire Hurricane” Investigation (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ct/pr/fbiattorney-admits-altering-email-used-fisa-application-during-crossfire-hurricane. 50 John Bowden, FBI agent in texts: ‘We’ll stop’ Trump from becoming president, THE HILL (June 14, 2018); Jim Geraghty, Why Did Two FBI Officials Discuss an ‘Insurance Policy’ In Case of Trump’s Election?, NAT. REVIEW (Dec. 14, 2017).

• 10. 9 of President Trump.51 The FBI’s protestations that it is not biased against conservatives ring hollow when it actively suppressed true and explosive allegations concerning the family of the Democrat nominee for president in 2020. It is impossible to know what would have happened if the FBI had not prebunked the allegations about Biden family influence peddling. But it is unquestionable that the FBI’s actions influenced the 2020 presidential election. And it cannot happen again. 51 See Josh Christenson, FBI abuses security clearance to ‘purge’ conservatives, views them as ‘unworthy’ of employment: whistleblower, N.Y. POST (July 2, 2024); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FBI WHISTLEBLOWER TESTIMONY HIGHLIGHTS GOVERNMENT ABUSE, MISALLOCATION OF RESOURCES, AND RETALIATION (Comm. Print May 18, 2023).

• 11. 10 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..................................................................................................................... 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................................... 10 I. Background....................................................................................................................... 11 II. After the FBI obtained the laptop with information on Biden family corruption in late 2019, the FBI began to condition Big Tech to incorrectly treat it as Russian disinformation...... 13 A. The FBI case team that possessed and authenticated Hunter Biden’s laptop in late 2019 briefed the FITF about the laptop months before the Post story. ........................................... 15 B. The FBI and Big Tech met 30-plus times in 2020 to discuss a potential “hack and leak” while Big Tech privately laughed about “influenc[ing] the 2020 elections.”......................... 17 1. FITF Bilateral Meetings..................................................................................................... 18 2. USG-Industry Meetings..................................................................................................... 19 C. The FBI specifically warned Big Tech about a Russian hack-and-leak operation in fall 2020 involving “Burisma” and the Biden family. .................................................................. 24 D. Social media companies changed their policies on hacked materials and started “inoculating” the public for a “hack and leak.” ...................................................................... 32 1. Facebook............................................................................................................................ 32 2. Google................................................................................................................................ 36 3. Twitter................................................................................................................................ 37 E. The Aspen Institute hosted a tabletop exercise for Big Tech companies about a potential Russian hack-and-leak scenario involving the Bidens and Burisma. ..................................... 38 III. Big Tech censored the true story, and the FBI hid key information, while millions voted……………………………………………………………………………………………...40 A. Big Tech quickly censored the true New York Post story, believing it was “exactly” what the FBI had warned about for months..................................................................................... 41 B. Big Tech reached out to the FBI and the FBI hid key information. .................................. 46 1. The Twitter-FITF Bilateral Meeting.................................................................................. 46 2. The FBI’s Internal Deliberations....................................................................................... 48 3. The Facebook-FITF Bilateral Meeting .............................................................................. 50 4. The USG-Industry Meeting ............................................................................................... 52 5. The FITF’s Follow-Up Discussions .................................................................................. 53 C. Despite a lack of evidence, Big Tech continued to censor the story because of concerns about a potential Biden-Harris Administration....................................................................... 55 1. Facebook............................................................................................................................ 55 2. Twitter................................................................................................................................ 62 3. Other companies ................................................................................................................ 65 D. FBI continued to withhold information as Big Tech continued to reach out..................... 67 IV. Epilogue: The fight against FBI election interference continues...................................... 71 V. Appendix........................................................................................................................... 76

• 12. 11 I. Background “Hack & Leak[.] FBI tipped us all off last week that this Burisma story was likely to emerge, and today’s call indicated that.” —Oct. 14, 2020, 3:27 p.m. ET, internal notes from Microsoft summarizing a “USG-Industry” meeting on the day the New York Post published the story on the Biden family’s influence peddling. 52 As the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government have revealed, following the 2016 election, offices within the Executive Branch launched efforts to covertly censor Americans’ free expression. The FBI formed the Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) in the fall of 2017.53 The Global Engagement Center (GEC), a multi-agency entity housed within the State Department established by President Obama in early 2016 to counter terrorism,54 expanded its mandate in 2017 to include countering foreign disinformation.55 Not to be outdone, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) formed the Countering Foreign Influence Task Force (CFITF) in 2018, which evolved into the “Mis, Dis, and Malinformation (MDM) Team” in 2021 to counter foreign and American speech.56 Once the Biden-Harris Administration took power, these censorship efforts only further expanded. Senior members of the Biden-Harris White House immediately began a months-long pressure campaign on Facebook, YouTube, Amazon, and other companies to censor views disfavored by the Biden-Harris Administration. 57 The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) launched ODNI’s Foreign Malign Influence Center in 2021. 58 DHS created the Orwellian Disinformation Governance Board in May 2022. 59 And CISA built out and met 52 Microsoft internal meeting notes (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:27 p.m.), see Ex. 3. 53 Combatting Foreign Influence, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence (last visited Oct. 18, 2024). 54 Exec. Order No. 13,721, 81 C.F.R. 14943 (2016). 55 The Global Engagement Center: Leading the United States Government’s Fight Against Global Disinformation Threat: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on State Dep’t and USAID Management, Int’l Operations, and Bilateral Int’l Development of the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 116th Cong. (Mar. 5, 2020). 56 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 118TH CONG., THE WEAPONIZATION OF CISA: HOW A “CYBERSECURITY” AGENCY COLLUDED WITH BIG TECH AND “DISINFORMATION” PARTNERS TO CENSOR AMERICANS (Comm. Print June 26, 2023); see also STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 118TH CONG., THE WEAPONIZATION OF ‘DISINFORMATION’ PSEUDO-EXPERTS AND BUREAUCRATS: HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PARTNERED WITH UNIVERSITIES TO CENSOR AMERICANS’ POLITICAL SPEECH (Comm. Print Nov. 6, 2023). 57 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY & SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE CENSORSHIP-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW TOP BIDEN WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS COERCED BIG TECH TO CENSOR AMERICANS, TRUE INFORMATION, AND CRITIC OF THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION, (Comm. Print May 1, 2024). 58 Organization, NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-who-weare/organization/340-about/organization/foreign-malign-influence-center (last visited Oct. 18, 2024). 59 Amanda Seitz, Disinformation board to tackle Russia, migrant smugglers, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 28, 2022).

• 13. 12 with its MDM Advisory Subcommittee—featuring Big Tech executives and disinformation pseudo-scientists—throughout 2022.60 The Executive Branch also began colluding with private and academic institutions on censorship during this period. The Committee and Select Subcommittee’s oversight of the censorship-industrial complex has revealed how a consortium of “disinformation” academics led by Stanford University’s Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO), called the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP), worked directly with CISA and the GEC to monitor and censor Americans’ online speech in advance of the 2020 presidential election.61 Created in the summer of 2020 “at the request of DHS/CISA,” 62 the EIP enabled the federal government to launder its censorship activities through a university in hopes of bypassing both the First Amendment and public scrutiny.63 This constellation of censorship organizations, alongside Big Tech, worked overtime to nominally “secure” the 2020 election from foreign interference.64 In reality, this meant censoring election-related speech, including questions about the validity of unrestricted mail-in voting.65 And it also meant “inoculating” the public against damaging stories about Biden family influence peddling. 66 60 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 118TH CONG., THE WEAPONIZATION OF CISA: HOW A “CYBERSECURITY” AGENCY COLLUDED WITH BIG TECH AND ‘DISINFORMATION’ PARTNERS TO CENSOR AMERICANS (Comm. Print June 26, 2023). 61 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 118TH CONG., THE WEAPONIZATION OF ‘DISINFORMATION’ PSEUDO-EXPERTS AND BUREAUCRATS: HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PARTNERED WITH UNIVERSITIES TO CENSOR AMERICANS’ POLITICAL SPEECH (Comm. Print Nov. 6, 2023). 62 Email from Graham Brookie to Atlantic Council employees (July 31, 2020, 5:54 p.m.); see Ex. 123. 63 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY & SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE WEAPONIZATION OF ‘DISINFORMATION’ PSEUDO-EXPERTS AND BUREAUCRATS: HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PARTNERED WITH UNIVERSITIES TO CENSOR AMERICANS’ FREE SPEECH (Comm. Print Nov. 6, 2023). 64 Id. 65 Id. 66 Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:04 p.m.), see Ex. 1.

• 14. 13 II. After the FBI obtained the laptop with information on Biden family corruption in late 2019, the FBI began to condition Big Tech to incorrectly treat it as Russian disinformation “We have recently received indications from USG partners that they believe there is a risk of a hack/leak operation conducted by Russian actors, likely involving real or manufactured evidence concerning links between the Biden family and Ukraine, including the oil company Burisma. Timing for something like this is uncertain, but could happen as soon as the first presidential debate on September 29th.” —Sept. 21, 2020, 2:04 p.m. ET, internal Facebook email about a potential Russian hack-and-leak threat. 67 In 2019, the FBI obtained a hard drive from a laptop attributed to Hunter Biden. 68 Gary Shapley, an IRS whistleblower who spent years overseeing a tax evasion case against Hunter Biden, testified that by November 2019, the FBI had “verified [the laptop’s] authenticity” by “matching the device number against Hunter Biden’s Apple iCloud ID.” 69 As the New York Post later detailed, the laptop contained evidence of a variety of crimes, including extensive evidence of broad influence peddling schemes committed by the Biden family and Biden family business associates. 70 The laptop also included evidence of Hunter Biden’s use of illegal drugs while engaging in other illicit activities.71 The laptop has since been used as evidence in Hunter Biden’s recent felony conviction on federal gun charges.72 In 2020, just a few months after the FBI authenticated Hunter Biden’s laptop, it began a months-long campaign to “prebunk” a potential news story about the laptop’s contents, conditioning Big Tech platforms to falsely believe that Hunter Biden and his shady business dealings with the Ukrainian oil company Burisma would be the subject of the next Russian hackand-leak operation. 73 A hack-and-leak operation is when an actor obtains information from a hacking campaign, then releases, or “leaks,” that information via social media or other means for public consumption. 67 Id. 68 Transcribed Interview of Gary Shapley, H. Comm. on Ways and Means (May 26, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 12; see also Marshall Cohen & Holmes Lybrand, Special counsel plans to use infamous Hunter Biden laptop as evidence at gun trial, CNN (May 22, 2024); Ingrid Jacques, Trump right about Hunter’s ‘laptop from hell,’ though Biden claimed Russian disinformation, USA TODAY (June 6, 2024); Emma-Jo Morris & Gabrielle Fonrouge, Smoking-gun email reveals how Hunter Biden introduced Ukrainian businessman to VP dad, N.Y. POST (Oct. 14, 2020). 69 Transcribed Interview of Gary Shapley, H. Comm. on Ways and Means (May 26, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 12. 70 See Emma-Jo Morris & Gabrielle Fonrouge, Smoking-gun email reveals how Hunter Biden introduced Ukrainian businessman to VP dad, N.Y. POST (Oct. 14, 2020). 71 Id. 72 Marshall Cohen & Holmes Lybrand, Special counsel plans to use infamous Hunter Biden laptop as evidence at gun trial, CNN (May 22, 2024). 73 See, e.g., Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:04 p.m.), Ex. 1.

• 15. 14 The FBI raised warnings about a potential hack-and-leak operation in meetings between the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) and Big Tech companies. The FBI first began meeting with Big Tech companies during the 2018 election cycle to share information about potential foreign influence operations for which platforms should be on the lookout. 74 In 2020, the FBI began raising specific warnings about a potential Russian hack and leak of information related to the Biden family—namely Hunter Biden—and Burisma, which would appear through authentic news sources.75 By September 2020, many platforms had actively prepared to address this specific potential hack-and-leak scenario. On September 1, 2020, Google began enforcing a new policy specifically designed to curtail the distribution of hacked political materials.76 Later in the month, Facebook made an “inoculating announcement” to “mitigate the impact of such a leak if it does occur,” 77 and then changed its hack-and-leak policies in October “to ensure we are prepared for foreign-backed leak operations that may develop in the weeks to come.”78 Also in September 2020, representatives from the country’s largest platforms, including many who were regularly attending FITF meetings, participated in a tabletop exercise—a meeting where participants engage with a hypothetical scenario and offer potential responses and solutions to the hypothetical problems—set up by the Aspen Institute to wargame a response to a potential scenario involving leaked documents concerning Hunter Biden’s work with Burisma.79 By the time the Post published its story on Biden family influence peddling on October 14, 2020, Big Tech platforms had (1) been thoroughly primed to view the story as a Russian hack-and-leak influence operation; (2) developed and implemented new protocols for handling content relating to a potential hack and leak; and (3) brainstormed and practiced their new responses in tabletop exercises with other platforms and news outlets in the months prior. Although the FBI conditioned Big Tech to believe any allegations about Hunter Biden were Russian disinformation, the social media companies are far from blameless. Internal messages obtained by the Committee and Select Subcommittee show that personnel at the social media platforms knew the dangerous consequences of their censorship decisions. In one message thread from July 2020, a member of Facebook’s Trust and Safety team said that when Facebook employees inevitably “get hauled up to the hill to testify on why we influenced the 2020 elections,” they would be able to say that they had “been meeting for YEARS with USG to plan for it.” 80 74 Declaration of Yoel Roth, ¶¶ 10–11, Federal Elections Comm’n MUR 7821 (Dec. 17, 2020). 75 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 20, 2020, 6:26 p.m.), see Ex. 13; Microsoft internal meeting notes (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:27 p.m.), see Ex. 3. 76 Hacked political materials policy global roll-out (November 2020), GOOGLE (Sept. 1, 2020), https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/9991623. 77 Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:04 p.m.), see Ex. 1. 78 Internal Facebook email to CEO Mark Zuckerberg and COO Sheryl Sandberg (Oct. 5, 2020, 5:29 a.m.), see Ex. 75. 79 See infra Section II.E; Email from Aspen Digital staff to Roundtable participants (Sept. 1, 2020, 7:44 p.m.), Ex. 99; see also Aspen Digital Hack-and-Dump Scenario Outline (Sept. 2020), Ex. 100. 80 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (July 15, 2020, 3:17 p.m.), see Ex. 10.

• 16. 15 “But, when we get hauled up to the hill to testify on why we influenced the 2020 elections we can say we have been meeting for YEARS with USG [the U.S. Government] to plan for it.” —July 15, 2020, internal messages among Facebook personnel These messages show that, while Big Tech may not have known that the FBI was priming them to censor a true story, they understood that their meetings with the U.S. government regarding online speech could very well influence the 2020 election. A. The FBI case team that possessed and authenticated Hunter Biden’s laptop in late 2019 briefed the FITF about the laptop months before the Post story. In late 2019, during the course of an ongoing investigation, the FBI seized and authenticated the hard drive of the laptop attributed to Hunter Biden, the subject of the October 14, 2020 New York Post article.81 Evidence obtained by the Committee and Select Subcommittee shows that the FBI case team was in contact with the FITF months prior to the New York Post story. The FBI Special Agent who served as the FITF’s Russia Unit Chief from mid-2019 to June 2021 testified that he received “three to five briefings” on the case because the Hunter Biden investigation was linked to Ukraine, which fell under the purview of the Russia Unit.82 The FITF Russia Chief further 81 Transcribed Interview of Gary Shapley, H. Comm. on Ways and Means (May 26, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 12; see also Marshall Cohen & Holmes Lybrand, Special counsel plans to use infamous Hunter Biden laptop as evidence at gun trial, CNN (May 22, 2024); Ingrid Jacques, Trump right about Hunter’s ‘laptop from hell,’ though Biden claimed Russian disinformation, USA TODAY (June 6, 2024). 82 Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024), (on file with the Comm.) at 28-29.

• 17. 16 testified that he first learned that the FBI was in possession of a laptop attributed to Hunter Biden in one of these briefings before the Post article was published. 83 Similarly, an FBI Criminal Investigative Division analyst detailed to the FITF in 2020 testified that he learned about the existence of the Hunter Biden investigation “a few months before” October 14, when he received an internal FBI document confirming it, though he did not learn about the laptop until the morning the Post article broke. 84 The FITF Russia Unit Chief’s testimony that members of the FITF knew that the FBI was in possession of Hunter Biden’s authenticated laptop prior to the Post story is consistent with other testimony received by the Committee and Select Subcommittee.85 Laura Dehmlow, thenChina Unit Chief of the FITF and now the Section Chief of the FITF, testified that she and others knew that the FBI was in possession of the laptop well before October 14, 2020.86 Dehmlow testified to the Committee: Q. When the information was relayed to you following the Twitter call that the first agent had said the laptop was real, just to clarify, you knew prior to that conversation that the laptop was real. Is that correct? A. I did, yes. Q. But you don’t recall when approximately you learned. A. I don’t, sorry. Q. Sitting here today, do you know when the FBI first determined that the laptop was real? A. I don’t. I know that there is some information in the public record regarding when the FBI acquired the laptop, but I don’t, sitting here, remember that date. Q. Do you know who else at FITF knew that the laptop was real? A. I don’t actually. I would assume both my – yes, I would certainly say that Brad Benavides [then-Section Chief of the FITF] was aware. 87 83 Id. 84 Transcribed Interview of an FBI Criminal Investigative Division Analyst, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 23, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 89-90. 85 Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.); Transcribed Interview of the Assistant Section Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Apr. 24, 2024) (on file with Comm.); Transcribed Interview of Laura Dehmlow, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 17, 2023) (on file with Comm.). 86 Transcribed Interview of Laura Dehmlow, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 17, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 35- 37. 87 Even though two of the three FITF unit chiefs and the Assistant Section Chief testified that they knew that the FBI was in possession of the laptop in advance of the Post publishing its report, then-Section Chief Brad Benavides testified that he did not know the FBI was in possession of the laptop prior to the story. See Transcribed Interview of Bradley Benavides, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 28, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 146-160.

• 18. 17 Q. What about the individuals on the Russia unit? A. I would assume the unit chief was also aware. I’m pretty certain of that fact. Q. For the individual -- DOJ Counsel: Just to clarify, do you know to a certainty that they were aware, or are you just making deductions? A. I’m pretty certain that they were aware.88 This testimony confirms that senior personnel of the FITF, the FBI task force providing warnings to Big Tech about a potential Russian hack-and-leak operation involving Hunter Biden and Burisma, knew that the FBI was in possession of the Hunter Biden laptop well before the Post article publicly disclosed the existence of the laptop or the evidence of influence peddling contained therein. B. The FBI and Big Tech met 30-plus times in 2020 to discuss a potential “hack and leak” while Big Tech privately laughed about “influenc[ing] the 2020 elections.” Throughout 2020, two parallel tracks emerged for information sharing between government agencies and Big Tech. In “FITF Bilateral Meetings,” FBI FITF staff would meet with individual social media platforms to discuss a number of topics, generally relating to ongoing or anticipated foreign influence operations. In “USG-Industry meetings,” the FBI’s FITF, other federal agencies, and social media companies convened as a large group to share information about potential foreign influence campaigns. Several of the FITF personnel who knew that the laptop was authentic prior to the release of the New York Post story attended these large group meetings. 89 Through both sets of meetings, the U.S. government shared specific warnings of a potential Russian hack-and-leak operation relating to Hunter Biden and Burisma, priming social media platforms to censor the Post story when it broke on October 14, 2020.90 88 Transcribed Interview of Laura Dehmlow, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 17, 2023), (on file with the Comm.), at 37. 89 See, e.g., USG-Industry meeting invitation (Apr. 20, 2022, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 45; USG-Industry meeting invitation (May 13, 2020, 4:00 p.m.), Ex. 47; USG-Industry meeting invitation (June 10, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 51; USGIndustry meeting invitation (July 8, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 71; USG-Industry meeting invitation (July 15, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 57; USG-Industry meeting invitation (Aug. 12, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 59; USG-Industry meeting invitation (Sept. 9, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 72; USG-Industry meeting invitation (Sept. 16, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 64; USGIndustry meeting invitation (Oct. 7, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 68; USG-Industry meeting invitation (Oct. 14, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 27; USG-Industry meeting invitation (Oct. 21, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 73; USG-Industry meeting invitation (Oct. 28, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 74. 90 Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:04 p.m.), see Ex. 1; see also Declaration of Yoel Roth, ¶¶ 10–11, Federal Elections Comm’n MUR 7821 (Dec. 17, 2020).

• 19. 18 1. FITF Bilateral Meetings From February 10, 2020 to October 14, 2020, the FBI’s FITF met over two dozen times with Google, Twitter, Facebook, Microsoft, and other companies in one-on-one “FITF Bilateral Meetings”—including individual meetings with Facebook and Twitter on October 14, 2020, the day that the Post story published.91 These bilateral meetings have restarted in 2024.92 FBI agents—typically Elvis Chan, Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s San Francisco Field Office—scheduled FITF bilateral meetings with social media companies quarterly, with additional calls or meetings on an ad hoc basis.93 Because the FBI would share technical threat intelligence and analysis, the social media platforms’ threat intelligence teams would generally be responsible for attending and participating in the FITF bilateral meetings.94 While the FITF primarily shared technical, actor-focused information with Big Tech companies in these meetings, it also discussed high-level strategies and themes employed by foreign actors.95 The Russia Unit Chief of the FITF testified that he was “certain” there was discussion of a potential “hack-and-leak” threat from Russia during these meetings.96 He explained that in the FITF bilateral meetings, “we often talked about tactics that had happened in the past.” 97 Because “larger cyber actors” like Russia had shown a propensity for this kind of 91 See, e.g., Email from Elvis Chan to Yahoo personnel (Jan. 3, 2020, 3:46 p.m.), Ex. 19; Email from Elvis Chan to LinkedIn personnel (Jan. 3, 2020, 3:48 p.m.), Ex. 18; Email from Elvis Chan to Google personnel (Jan. 6, 2020, 8:25 p.m.), Ex. 15; Email from Elvis Chan to Yahoo personnel (Apr. 13, 2020, 4:15 p.m.), Ex. 20; Email from Elvis Chan to LinkedIn personnel (Apr. 13, 2020, 11:21 p.m.), Ex. 24; Email from Elvis Chan to Google personnel (Apr. 14, 2020, 9:51 p.m.), Ex. 21; Email from Elvis Chan to Facebook personnel (May 12, 2020, 5:29 p.m.), Ex. 22; Email from Elvis Chan to Google personnel (July 14, 2020, 10:59 a.m.), Ex. 26; Email from Elvis Chan to LinkedIn personnel (July 14, 2020, 11:02 a.m.), Ex. 31; Email from Elvis Chan to Yahoo personnel (July 14, 2020, 1:58 p.m.), Ex. 28; Email from Elvis Chan to Facebook personnel (July 16, 2020, 10:10 p.m.), Ex. 29; Email from Elvis Chan to Google personnel (Sept. 10, 2020, 2:13 p.m.), Ex. 33; Email from Elvis Chan to LinkedIn personnel (Sept. 10, 2020, 2:13 p.m.), Ex. 37; Email from Elvis Chan to Facebook personnel (Sept. 10, 2020, 5:12 p.m.), Ex. 36; Email from Elvis Chan to Yahoo personnel (Sept. 14, 2020, 5:21 p.m.), Ex. 34; Email from Elvis Chan to Google personnel (Sept. 29, 2020, 11:04 a.m.), Ex. 39; Email from Elvis Chan to Google personnel (Sept. 29, 2020, 11:04 a.m.), Ex. 40; Email from Elvis Chan to Yahoo personnel (Sept. 29, 2020, 11:09 a.m.), Ex. 70; Email from Elvis Chan to Reddit personnel (Sept. 29, 2020, 11:10 a.m.), Ex. 69; Email from Elvis Chan to LinkedIn personnel (Sept. 29, 2020, 2:08 p.m.), Ex. 41; Email from Elvis Chan to Facebook personnel (Oct. 4, 2020, 2:31 p.m.), Ex. 16; see also Ex. 42 (Emails from FBI to Big Tech participants scheduling FITF Bilateral meetings). 92 Kevin Collier & Ken Dilanian, FBI Resumes Outreach to Social Media Companies Over Foreign Propaganda, NBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2024). 93 Transcribed Interview of Yoel Roth, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 1, 2023) (on file with the Comm.) at 22-23; Transcribed Interview of an FBI Criminal Investigative Division Analyst, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 23, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 25. 94 Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 143. 95 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 24-080, EVALUATION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S EFFORTS TO COORDINATE INFORMATION SHARING ABOUT FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE THREATS TO U.S. ELECTIONS (July 2024) at 17-18. 96 Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 21. 97 Id.

• 20. 19 campaign in the past via other hack-and-leak operations, “that’s certainly one of the tactics [the FITF] discussed” with social media companies.98 Occasionally, Big Tech’s policy staff attended these bilateral meetings for awareness of the matters under discussion.99 For example, the Russia Unit Chief specifically remembered that the Facebook employee who developed an updated hack-and-leak policy for the platform (and subsequently briefed CEO Mark Zuckerberg on these changes) sometimes attended FITFFacebook bilateral meetings. 100 In Elvis Chan’s Murthy v. Missouri deposition, he confirmed that in bilateral meetings, the FBI discussed platforms’ policies regarding hacked materials and how the policies might apply to potential foreign influence operations. 101 2. USG-Industry Meetings A second set of standing meetings occurred among several government stakeholders (including the FBI, DOJ, CISA, DHS’s Office of Intelligence & Analysis, and ODNI) and a group of industry participants from many different companies (including Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Microsoft, among others). Based on the documents the Committee and Select Subcommittee have obtained, the first USG-Industry meeting for the 2020 election occurred no later than April of 2020. 102 These meetings continued on a monthly—and then, as the election drew nearer, weekly—basis in the lead-up to the 2020 election, including on October 14, 2020— the day the Post story broke.103 In 2024, CISA and the FBI resumed meetings with Big Tech. 104 The USG-Industry meetings were a regular forum for federal agencies and social media companies to exchange high-level information about foreign threats. Meeting agendas and other 98 Id. 99 Id. at 143-145. 100 Id. at 145; see e.g., Internal Facebook email to CEO Mark Zuckerberg and COO Sheryl Sandberg (Oct. 5, 2020, 5:29 a.m.), Ex. 75. 101 Murthy v. Missouri, No. 3:22-cv-01213, 2023 WL 43352270 (WD La. July 4, 2023) (Deposition of Elvis Chan), at 203-206. 102 USG-Industry meeting invitation (Apr. 20, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), see Ex. 45. 103 See, e.g., Email from CISA personnel to industry participants (May 12, 2020, 9:12 a.m.), Ex. 46; USG-Industry meeting invitation (May 13, 2020, 4:00 p.m.), Ex. 47; Internal Facebook readout of USG-Industry meeting (May 14, 2020, 11:31 a.m.), Ex. 48; Agenda emails between industry participants (June 9, 2020, 1:45 p.m.), Ex. 49; Scheduling email from Facebook personnel to industry group (June 9, 2020, 8:45 p.m.), Ex. 50; Internal Facebook readout of the USG-Industry meeting (June 10, 2020, 8:35 a.m.), Ex. 53; USG-Industry Meeting invitation (June 10, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 51; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (June 30, 2020, 6:31 p.m.), Ex. 52; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (July 1, 2020, 4:14 p.m.), Ex. 54; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (July 10, 2020, 5:12 a.m.), Ex. 55; Scheduling email from Google personnel to industry group (July 14, 2020, 10:13 p.m.), Ex. 27; USG-Industry Meeting invitation (July 15, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 57; Internal Facebook readout of the USG-Industry meeting (July 17, 2020, 7:17 a.m.), Ex. 58; USG-Industry Meeting invitation (Aug. 12, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 59; Internal Facebook readout of the USG-Industry meeting (Aug. 13, 2020, 5:58 a.m.), Ex. 60; Agenda emails between CISA and Facebook personnel (Sept. 9, 2020, 11:41 a.m.), Ex. 66;Agenda emails between industry participants (Sept. 11, 2020, 12:40 p.m.), Ex. 61; Scheduling email from Facebook personnel to industry group (Sept. 11, 2020, 1:00 p.m.), Ex. 62; Agenda emails between CISA and Facebook personnel (Sept. 15, 2020, 8:06 a.m.), Ex. 63; USG-Industry Meeting invitation (Sept. 16, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 64; Internal Facebook notes about USG-Industry meeting (Sept. 16, 2020), Ex. 65; Agenda emails between CISA and Facebook personnel (Oct. 5, 2020, 6:41 a.m.), Ex. 67; USG-Industry Meeting invitation (Oct. 7, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), Ex. 68. 104 David DiMolfetta, CISA, FBI resuming talks with social media firms over disinformation removal, Senate Intel chair says, NEXTGOV/FCW (May 7, 2024).

• 21. 20 documents obtained by the Committee and Select Subcommittee show that the federal agencies and Big Tech repeatedly discussed “Hack/Leak” in the meetings leading up to the 2020 election. For example, a meeting on July 15, 2020, included “Hack/Leak and USG Attribution Speed/Process” as an agenda item listed under the heading “Deep Dive Topics.” 105 “Hack/Leak and USG Attribution Speed/Process” —July 15, 2020, USG-Industry meeting agenda 105 USG-Industry meeting agenda (July 14, 2020, 3:11 p.m.), Ex. 76.

• 22. 21 From the beginning, the platforms understood what the FBI was doing. During the July 15, 2020, meeting, one Facebook employee messaged a colleague, writing that “when we get hauled up to the hill to testify on why we influenced the 2020 elections,” they would be able to say they had “been meeting for YEARS with USG to plan for it.” 106 Meeting participants clearly understood that these discussions would have major electoral consequences. “[W]hen we get hauled up to the hill to testify on why we influenced the 2020 elections we can say we have been meeting for YEARS with USG to plan for it.” —July 15, 2020, internal messages among Facebook personnel 106 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (July 15, 2020, 3:17 p.m.), see Ex. 10; USG-Industry meeting invitation (July 15, 2020, 2:00 p.m.), see Ex. 77.

• 23. 22 In a September 16, 2020, USG-Industry meeting, Big Tech and federal agencies discussed “hack and leak operations” again. 107 Facebook’s internal readout of the meeting explained that the discussion focused on “preparing for ‘hack and leak’ operations attempting to use platforms and traditional media to amplify unauthorized information drops,” among other topics.108 “[P]reparing for ‘hack and leak’ operations” —Sept. 17, 2020 internal Facebook notes about USG-Industry meeting 107 USG-Industry Meeting invitation (Sept. 16, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), see Ex. 64. 108 Internal Facebook readout of USG-Industry meeting (Sept. 17, 2020, 12:55 p.m.), see Ex. 78.

• 24. 23 Finally, on October 7, 2020, just one week before the Post article on Biden family influence peddling was published, the USG-Industry meeting agenda again included “Hack/Leak concerns” as a topic of discussion.109 “Deep Dive Topics . . . Hack/Leak Concerns” —Sept. 29, 2020, USG-Industry meeting draft agenda 109 USG-Industry meeting draft agenda (Sept. 29, 2020, 2:41 p.m.), see Ex. 67.

• 25. 24 According to Facebook’s readout, “[t]he discussion focused on efforts to identify and mitigate delegitimization claims against US2020 electoral outcomes, including potential hack/leak scenarios.”110 “The discussion focused on efforts to identify and mitigate…potential hack/leak scenarios” —Oct. 8, 2020, internal Facebook notes on Oct. 7 USG-Industry meeting C. The FBI specifically warned Big Tech about a Russian hack-and-leak operation in fall 2020 involving “Burisma” and the Biden family. According to emails, meeting invitations, and internal readouts of meetings between U.S. government officials and Big Tech employees, foreign influence operations—and hack-and-leak threats specifically—were a recurring topic of discussion among the FBI and social media 110 Internal Facebook readout of USG-Industry meeting (Oct. 8, 2020, 10:24 a.m.), see Ex. 80.

• 26. 25 companies. 111 In September 2020, the Big Tech companies participating in these meetings confirmed in a joint press statement that these discussions focused on “[w]ays to counter targeted attempts to undermine the election conversation before, during, and after the election,” including “preparing for possible so-called ‘hack and leak’ operations attempting to use platforms and traditional media to amplify unauthorized information drops.” 112 “[W]e specifically discussed…preparing for possible so-called ‘hack and leak’ operations” —Sept. 2020 statement from tech industry participants in USG-Industry meetings While Big Tech issued public statements about how it was generally discussing potential hack-and-leak operations with the U.S. government, the discussions themselves were more specific. Indeed, according to internal Big Tech documents obtained by the Committee and Select Subcommittee, the FBI told Big Tech to expect a “hack/leak operation” that almost exactly matched the details of the New York Post reporting on Biden family influence peddling. 113 The FBI got the date and the contents right: it repeatedly warned that the supposed hack-and-leak operation would come right before the election, likely as “an October surprise,” 114 and that it would reveal “evidence” regarding “links between the Biden family and Ukraine,” 111 See, e.g., USG-Industry meeting agenda (July 14, 2020, 3:11 p.m.), Ex. 76; Internal Facebook readout of USGIndustry meeting (Sept. 17, 2020, 12:55 p.m.), Ex. 78; USG-Industry meeting draft agenda (Sept. 29, 2020, 2:41 p.m.), Ex. 67; Internal Facebook readout of USG-Industry meeting (Oct. 8, 2020, 10:24 a.m.), Ex. 80. 112 Statement from tech industry participants, see Ex. 11; see also Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Aug. 5, 2020), Ex. 12; Emails among tech industry participants (Sept. 15, 2020), Ex. 124. 113 See, e.g., Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:04 p.m.), Ex. 1; Microsoft internal meeting notes (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:27 p.m.), Ex. 3; see also Declaration of Yoel Roth, ¶¶ 10–11, Federal Elections Comm’n MUR 7821 (Dec. 17, 2020). 114 Internal message from Facebook personnel to Nick Clegg (Oct. 15, 2020, 9:29 a.m.), see Ex. 2.

• 27. 26 including the oil company “Burisma.” 115 In fact, the week before the Post story broke on October 14, the “FBI tipped [Big Tech] off” that “this Burisma story was likely to emerge.” 116 Documents obtained by the Committee and Select Subcommittee show that Big Tech got the message loud and clear. One Facebook employee predicted that “in the next few weeks” there would be “leaks about Biden’s supposed link to Burisma.” 117 This employee wrote that while Facebook would not “be able to prove” that these were hacks, the company would “have responsible USG players publicly saying this is part of a foreign influence operation,” and that their “secret squirrel partners”—apparently referring to U.S. government officials—would also say it was a Russian operation.118 He conceded that there would not be a “public smoking gun to prove” that the leaks were Russian operations, but that “the circumstantial public evidence will be quite strong.” 119 Facebook employees even discussed how the company’s policies might apply to different scenarios that “provide precedent for how [Facebook] would analyze the dissemination of materials that may result from a hack of Burisma” and how to brief leadership on their options.120 The statement proved prescient. Once the Post story was published just a few weeks later, Facebook’s “secret squirrel partners” did exactly what the platform expected.121 Fifty-one former intelligence community officials organized by Antony Blinken and the Biden campaign falsely claimed that the story bore “all the classic earmarks of a Russian information operation.”122 All the while, Big Tech censored the story even though it did not (and, of course, could not) prove that the story was Russian disinformation. 115 Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:04 p.m.), see Ex. 1. 116 Microsoft internal meeting notes (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:27 p.m.), see Ex. 3. 117 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 9, 2020, 2:28 p.m.), see Ex. 81. 118 Id. 119 Id. 120 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 9, 2020, 2:37 p.m.), see Ex. 81. 121 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 9, 2020, 2:28 p.m.), see Ex. 81. 122 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AND H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 118TH CONG., THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 51: HOW CIA CONTRACTORS COLLUDED WITH THE BIDEN CAMPAIGN TO MISLEAD AMERICAN VOTERS (Comm. Print June 25, 2024); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AND H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 118TH CONG., THE HUNTER BIDEN STATEMENT: HOW SENIOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OFFICIALS AND THE BIDEN CAMPAIGN WORKED TO MISLEAD AMERICAN VOTERS (Comm. Print May 10, 2023); see also Brooke Singman, Biden campaign, Blinken orchestrated intel letter to discredit Hunter Biden laptop story, exCIA official says, FOX NEWS (Apr. 20, 2023).

• 28. 27 “[W]e won’t be able to prove they were ‘hacked’, but . . . we will hear from our trusted secret squirrel partners that this is a Russian op.” —Sept. 19, 2020, internal messages among Facebook personnel In a separate exchange of messages between Facebook employees on September 20, 2020, an employee shared a BBC article about a “documents leak” revealing “how Russian

• 29. 28 oligarchs have used banks to avoid sanctions,” and asked, “Is this what we were anticipating?” 123 Another Facebook employee replied that the BBC article was not the story the company was on the lookout for: “I think what folks are preparing for are a possible leak or hack of documents from Burisma from the Ukraine that will be aimed at Joe Biden.” 124 Later in the same thread, another Facebook employee added that “we’ve gotten some indication from external partners that Russia may leverage a few distribution mechanisms to release the documents from a hack of Burisma,” and given that “Biden’s son Hunter worked for Burisma as a board member,” the Facebook employee was “worried about (1) legit documents released to embarrass or distract and (2) forged documents released under the aegis of the Burisma hack that are designed to directly target Biden.” 125 The Facebook employee warned that these would “be distributed via either authentic news sources, state media sources, or via domestic proxies.” 126 “I think what folks are preparing for are a possible leak or hack of documents from Burisma . . . that will be aimed at Joe Biden” —Sept. 20, 2020, internal messages among Facebook personnel 123 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 20, 2020, 1:48 p.m.), see Ex. 13; FinCEN Files: All you need to know about the documents leak, BBC (Sept. 21, 2020). 124 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 20, 2020, 6:26 p.m.), see Ex. 13. 125 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 20, 2020, 6:48 p.m.), see Ex. 13. 126 Id.

• 30. 29 The discussion continued with one Facebook employee noting that a leak may be “imminent.” 127 Another Facebook employee responded, “[we] expect this within the next 1-3 weeks.” 128 The date of the message—September 20, 2020—was just over three weeks before October 14th, the day that the New York Post story was published. “I think we’d expect [the hack and leak] within the next 1-3 weeks” —Sept. 20, 2020, internal messages among Facebook personnel, three weeks before the New York Post story on the Biden family’s influence peddling On September 21, 2020, in a separate email to Facebook leadership, including Facebook’s then-Vice President of Global Affairs Nick Clegg and Vice President of Global Public Policy Joel Kaplan, a Facebook employee stated clearly who specifically was warning Facebook about a Russian hack-and-leak threat involving Burisma and the Biden family in advance of the 2020 election: “USG [U.S. Government] partners.” 129 In her description of communications with “USG partners,” the Facebook employee wrote that “they [the U.S. government partners] believe there is a high risk of a hack/leak operation conducted by Russian actors, likely involving real or manufactured evidence concerning links between the Biden family and Ukraine, including the oil company Burisma.” 130 According to the Facebook 127 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 20, 2020, 6:54 p.m.), see Ex. 13. 128 Id. 129 Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:04 p.m.), see Ex. 1. 130 Id.; see also Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 18, 2020, 2:11 p.m.), Ex. 82; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020, 9:37 a.m.), Ex. 83.

• 31. 30 employee, U.S. government “partners” believed that the hack and leak “could happen as soon as the first presidential debate on September 29th.” 131 “USG partners . . . believe there is a risk of a hack/leak operation conducted by Russian actors . . . involving . . . evidence concerning links between the Biden family and Ukraine, including the oil company Burisma . . . [that] could happen as soon as the first presidential debate on September 29th” —Sept. 21, 2020 internal Facebook email to Facebook leadership, including Facebook’s thenVice President of Global Affairs Nick Clegg and Vice President of Global Public Policy Joel Kaplan 131 Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:04 p.m.), see Ex. 1; see also Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 18, 2020, 2:11 p.m.), Ex. 82.

• 32. 31 Consistent with Facebook’s internal discussions, internal Microsoft notes taken during a USG-Industry meeting on October 14, 2020, confirm that the FBI led the prebunking efforts, stating that the “FBI tipped us all off last week that this Burisma story was likely to emerge, and today’s call indicated that.” 132 “FBI tipped us all off last week that this Burisma story was likely to emerge” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal Microsoft notes on USG-Industry meeting These documents confirm that the U.S. government—specifically, the FBI—had not only discussed the possibility of a hack-and-leak operation with Big Tech platforms months before the Post story was published, but had also shared specific details, including the type of operation (hack and leak), who the target would be (then-candidate Biden and his family), when it would happen (late September or October 2020), who would orchestrate the leak (Russia), what information would be leaked (the Biden family’s relationship with Burisma), and how the information might be disseminated (via authentic news sources). The FBI shared this information with Big Tech platforms in both bilateral and USG-Industry meetings. As the Committee and Select Subcommittee have learned from witness testimony, multiple FBI personnel assigned to the FITF, the FBI’s task force that provided these “hack-and-leak” warnings, were aware that the FBI had seized and authenticated Hunter Biden’s laptop months prior. 133 132 Microsoft internal meeting notes (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:27 p.m.), see Ex. 3. 133 See Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 28-29; Transcribed Interview of Laura Dehmlow, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 17, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 35-37.

• 33. 32 D. Social media companies changed their policies on hacked materials and started “inoculating” the public for a “hack and leak.” In response to the repeated discussions with, and warnings from, the FBI and other federal agencies, platforms began preparing ways to combat an impending hack and leak of information relating to the Bidens and Burisma. Some platforms prepared by attempting to “inoculate the audience before the leak,” 134 while other platforms began to change their content moderation policies to include more strict provisions regarding hacked materials—including changes designed specifically to target hacked political materials.135 These efforts by social media platforms to prepare for a potential hack and leak culminated in September 2020, just one month before the Post published its story. 1. Facebook Facebook used public statements to raise awareness about a potential Russian hack-andleak operation and expanded its hack-and-leak policies to prepare for the potential operation. In September 2020, after receiving “indications from USG partners” that “there is a risk of a hack/leak operation conducted by Russian actors, likely involving real or manufactured evidence concerning links between the Biden family and Ukraine, including the oil company Burisma,” Facebook determined that the best way to prepare for this potential hack/leak operation was to “inoculate the audience.” 136 To accomplish this goal of inoculation, Facebook leveraged the announcement of its takedown of three Russian networks perpetrating influence operations around the globe to “both inform the public of our findings and the hack/leak risk and reassure them that we are on top of it.” 137 Facebook employees described this inoculation—or prebunking—as “one of the most effective techniques to counter a hack/leak.” 138 Facebook designed the announcement to prime Facebook users to view any pre-election release of damaging information about the Bidens as a Russian hack-and-leak influence operation—much like the FBI was priming social media companies to do. 139 In September 2020, Facebook believed that “an inoculating announcement about hack/leak now will mitigate the impact of such a leak if it does occur, and send a strong message about Facebook’s proactive stance even if no such leak materializes.” 140 134 Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:04 p.m.), see Ex. 1 (emphasis in original). 135 Emails between Google personnel and Democratic National Committee staff (Aug. 5, 2020, 5:27 p.m.), see Ex. 84. 136 Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:04 p.m.), see Ex. 1. 137 Id.; see also Email from Facebook personnel to DNI staff (Sept. 24, 2020, 4:16 p.m.), Ex. 85. 138 Id. 139 Id. 140 Id.

• 34. 33 “We know that one of the most effective techniques to counter a hack/leak is to inoculate the audience before the leak” —Sept. 21, 2020 internal messages among Facebook personnel In addition to inoculating its users to anticipate a hack-and-leak operation, Facebook also expanded its hack-and-leak policies. On October 5, 2020, Facebook employees emailed CEO Mark Zuckerberg and COO Sheryl Sandberg to make them “aware of a policy change designed to ensure we are prepared for foreign-backed leak operations that may develop in the weeks to come.” 141 The employees explained that the policy change would allow Facebook to “remove any leaked material (whether evidence of a hack exists or not) that is part of a foreign government influence operation.” 142 This was a change from previous policy, which permitted the removal of material resulting from a hack, but allowed leaked content to stay up “because of the significant role of whistleblowers in exposing corruption and empowering accountability throughout history.” 143 Critically, the Facebook employees told Zuckerberg and Sandberg that the policy had a “narrow focus” and would “only apply to leaks targeting the US 2020 election.” 144 141 Internal Facebook email to CEO Mark Zuckerberg and COO Sheryl Sandberg (Oct. 5, 2020, 5:29 a.m.), see Ex. 75. 142 Id. 143 Id. 144 Id.

• 35. 34 “We plan to expand [the hack-and-leak] policy…because our threat intelligence teams assess that a leak operation by Russian actors is a meaningful risk in the weeks to come.” —Oct. 5, 2020 internal Facebook email to CEO Mark Zuckerberg and COO Sheryl Sandberg Facebook employees told Zuckerberg and Sandberg that the company was “adopting this change because our threat intelligence teams assess that a leak operation by Russian actors is a meaningful risk in the weeks to come.” 145 The threat intelligence teams referenced in the email were the primary points of contact for the FBI’s FITF and participants in FITF-Facebook 145 Id.

• 36. 35 meetings, during which a potential Russian hack and leak involving the Bidens and Burisma had been discussed for months.146 Facebook’s close interactions with the FBI allowed its employees to “anticipate that this policy change will be supported by the security community,” while admitting that it “may raise eyebrows by some free speech advocates.” 147 “I’m supportive of” the expansion of the “hack leak policy to prepare for US/2020 risks.” —Oct. 5, 2020, email from CEO Mark Zuckerberg to Facebook personnel 146 Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with the Comm.) at 143. 147 Internal Facebook email to Mark Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg (Oct. 5, 2020, 5:29 a.m.), see Ex. 75.

• 37. 36 Zuckerberg asked specifically about how the company’s new policy would apply “[i]f a legitimate whistleblower also posts something that a foreign government had leaked.” 148 Other than this one question, he was “supportive” of the policy expansion prior to the Post story breaking.149 A Facebook employee responded that, in that situation, the company “would only remove if the leak was part of a foreign influence operation.”150 The emails between Zuckerberg and his Facebook team demonstrate how the FBI, specifically the FITF, prompted Facebook to change its content moderation policies. In the months preceding the 2020 presidential election, the FBI’s FITF met with Facebook’s threat intelligence team to warn them of a Russian hack-and-leak operation targeting the 2020 election. Based on these briefings, the threat intelligence team recommended an update to Facebook’s internal policies that would allow the company to remove additional content from the site. Facebook anticipated that the FBI and others would support this change, and Facebook leadership approved the change before its rollout at the beginning of October 2020. 2. Google Google also developed and implemented new policies prohibiting ads from linking to hacked political materials.151 U.S. enforcement of this new policy began on September 1, 2020— two months before the global policy went into effect.152 In August 2020, Google staff previewed this shift to employees of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), explaining that “[t]his policy is specifically related to the distribution of hacked political material.”153 DNC staff responded approvingly, thanking Google for its “work to reduce the risk and impact of hack-anddump operations.”154 148 Internal email from CEO Mark Zuckerberg to Facebook personnel (Oct. 5, 2020, 1:09 p.m.), see Ex. 75. 149 Id. 150 Internal Facebook email to CEO Mark Zuckerberg and COO Sheryl Sandberg (Oct. 5, 2020, 2:05 p.m.), see Ex. 75. 151 Hacked political materials policy global roll-out (November 2020), GOOGLE (Sept. 1, 2020) https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/9991623. 152 Id. 153 Emails between Google personnel and Democratic National Committee staff (Aug. 5, 2020, 5:27 p.m.), see Ex. 84. 154 Emails between Google personnel and Democratic National Committee staff (Aug. 5, 2020, 9:57 p.m.), see Ex. 84.

• 38. 37 “In September 2020, we announced a hacked political materials policy.” —Aug. 5, 2020 email between Google personnel and DNC staff 3. Twitter Twitter’s efforts to respond to a hack-and-leak operation began in 2018, when it started developing new policies to address concerns arising from the leaked 2016 DNC documents about how hacked materials could be distributed on the platform. Explaining how its new Distribution of Hacked Materials policy would have applied during the 2016 election, Twitter’s former Head of Trust and Safety, Yoel Roth, testified to the Committee that “Twitter would have removed tweets that were sharing the hacked materials, would have banned accounts directly associated

• 39. 38 with the hackers themselves,” and “likely would have restricted the sharing of links related to the hacked materials.” 155 Twitter adopted this policy because it “examined its role in the distribution of [former senior Clinton campaign official] John Podesta’s emails and other hacked materials” that were leaked in 2016.156 Twitter “reached the conclusion that we [Twitter] needed to have a policy restricting that type of behavior,” 157 and because of concerns raised by the U.S. intelligence community about vulnerabilities that might be exploited in the future. 158 These policies enabled the platform to later censor content based on the FBI’s warnings about a Russian hack and leak in 2020 involving the Bidens and Burisma.159 E. The Aspen Institute hosted a tabletop exercise for Big Tech companies about a potential Russian hack-and-leak scenario involving the Bidens and Burisma. Non-governmental third parties, though likely not privy to key information such as the fact that the FBI had Hunter Biden’s laptop, also were part of the prebunking campaign. Most notably, on June 25, 2020, Aspen Digital—a program of the Aspen Institute, a think-tank that has done significant work relating to so-called “information disorder” 160—hosted a “Hack and Leak Roundtable” that included “journalists, ethicists, First Amendment attorneys, and platform executives” for a discussion about “standards and ethics when it comes to publication and coverage in hack and leak scenarios.” 161 Documents obtained by the Committee and Select Subcommittee show that Facebook employees who had met with the FITF in 2020 were instrumental in developing and facilitating this roundtable and the subsequent tabletop exercise described below.162 The roundtable participants discussed how traditional news media and Big Tech platforms would handle materials that they obtained as a result of an alleged hack and leak, how to assess the motivation for hack and leaks, the role government actors could play in confirming whether the materials were authentic or had been manipulated in some way, and whether it was appropriate to apply information labels to related content. 163 Other attendees included representatives from Twitter, Reddit, Wikimedia Foundation, NBC News, CNN, NPR, the Washington Post, and the New York Times. 164 155 Transcribed Interview of Yoel Roth, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 1, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 21. 156 Id. at 20. John Podesta served as Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager in 2016. 157 Id. 158 Id. 159 See infra Section III.C.2. 160 Commission on Information Disorder, ASPEN INSTITUTE, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/commissionon-information-disorder/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2024). 161 Aspen Digital Hack and Leak Roundtable agenda (June 25, 2020), see Ex. 86. 162 See Emails between Aspen Institute and Facebook personnel (May 19, 2020, 5:48 p.m.), Ex. 91; Emails between Aspen Institute, Facebook, and Stanford personnel (June 25, 2020), Ex. 92; Emails between Aspen Institute and Facebook personnel (July 13, 2020), Ex. 93; Email from Aspen Institute personnel to Facebook personnel (Sept. 28, 2020, 12:01 p.m.), Ex. 94. 163 Id.; Aspen Digital Hack and Leak Roundtable meeting readout (July 2, 2020, 12:54 p.m.), see Ex. 87; see also Opening remarks from Aspen Institute roundtable, Ex. 88; Emails from Aspen Institute staff to industry participants (July 14, 2020), Ex. 89; Emails from Aspen Institute staff to industry participants (June 22, 2020), Ex. 90. 164 Aspen Digital Hack and Leak Roundtable participant list (June 25, 2020), see Ex. 95.

• 40. 39 A few months later, in September 2020, Aspen Digital hosted a tabletop exercise about a hack-and-leak scenario.165 In a tabletop exercise, participants simulate their responses to a hypothetical set of facts, reacting to the responses of other participants and new information revealed incrementally throughout the exercise. Unlike the roundtable, which broadly discussed how companies handle materials related to a hack and leak, this exercise revolved around a specific hypothetical scenario involving a leak of Burisma documents tied to Hunter Biden.166 Once again, Facebook personnel who had met with the FITF in 2020 were the primary drafters of the exercise. 167 According to internal Facebook messages and emails, one Facebook employee even rewrote the scenario as the date of the exercise approached. 168 The final exercise outline laid out a hypothetical day-by-day developing story, beginning on October 5, 2020, in which a news outlet obtained and published leaked documents involving Hunter Biden and Burisma, and various government actors and campaign officials began to respond.169 The scenario was designed to give social media platforms and news outlets the opportunity to “think through out loud” how they would respond and “game out how various tech platforms and news organizations would respond in real time as the story unfolded.” 170 This exercise gave social media companies the opportunity to stress test the hack-andleak responses they had proposed—and in some cases finalized—after the FBI’s warnings to expect one in September or October 2020. Even more, the scenario set forth by Aspen Digital closely mirrored the warnings given by the FBI and the details of the actual news story published by the Post just one month later. * * * By early October 2020, the stage had been set. In individual and group meetings with Big Tech platforms, the FBI’s FITF had repeatedly warned of an impending Russian hack and leak of documents alleging a Biden family influence peddling scheme relating specifically to Hunter Biden and Burisma. The social media platforms had deliberated and implemented new policies designed to limit the visibility of these documents if they did emerge. And in a tabletop exercise, the platforms had simulated how they would spike the exact story that the Post would ultimately publish. The prebunking was complete. When October 14 came, the platforms were ready to censor. 165 Email from Aspen Institute staff to industry participants (Aug. 12, 2020, 12:49 p.m.), see Ex. 96. 166 Id. 167 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 20, 2020, 8:03 p.m.), Ex. 97; Email from Aspen Institute personnel to Facebook and Twitter personnel (Aug. 7, 2020, 6:44 a.m.), Ex. 98. 168 Id. 169 Email from Aspen Digital staff to Roundtable participants (Sept. 1, 2020, 7:44 p.m.), Ex. 99; see also Aspen Digital Hack-and-Dump Scenario Outline (Sept. 2020), Ex. 100. 170 Id.

• 41. 40 III.Big Tech censored the true story, and the FBI hid key information, while millions voted “Obviously, our calls on this [New York Post story] could colour the way an incoming Biden administration views us more than almost anything else.” —October 14, 2020, WhatsApp message from Facebook’s thenVice President of Global Affairs Nick Clegg to Vice President of Global Public Policy Joel Kaplan about Facebook’s censorship of the New York Post story. 171 Early on October 14, 2020, the New York Post published an article, sourced from the contents of Hunter Biden’s abandoned laptop, exposing Biden family influence-peddling in Ukraine and around the world. 172 For months, the FBI had conditioned social media companies to expect a Russian hack-and-leak operation that would target the Bidens and Burisma. The companies had developed responses for this scenario and had war-gamed the best way to apply them. The scenario they had been expecting, it seemed, was finally playing out. Conditioned to assess that the story was the product of a hack and leak, social media companies’ initial response to the Post story was to censor it. Some companies wanted more information, though, and reached out to the FBI to be certain that this was the hack and leak they had been warned of before making final decisions about whether to continue their censorship of the story and the content within. But the FBI refused to acknowledge that it possessed and had authenticated the laptop. Having not received this critical information from the FBI about the provenance of the laptop, social media platforms continued doing what they had been primed to do since early 2020: censor the Post’s true article. Twitter blocked the URL to the story and prohibited it from being shared on the platform, citing violations of its hacked materials policies. Facebook manually demoted the story in its algorithm, making users less likely to see it. Although platforms used different tools to achieve their goal, each invoked the warnings they received from their meetings with the government to explain why they censored the story. 173 But the FBI’s warnings were not the only thing motivating Big Tech. Platforms were keenly aware that their “calls on this [New York Post story] could colour the way an incoming Biden administration views us more than almost anything else.” 174 Platforms knew that if they 171 Messages between Nick Clegg and Joel Kaplan (Oct. 14, 2020), Ex. 101. 172 Emma-Jo Morris & Gabrielle Fonrouge, Smoking-gun email reveals how Hunter Biden introduced Ukrainian businessman to VP dad, N.Y. Post (Oct. 14, 2020). 173 See, e.g., Letter from Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Meta, to Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Aug. 26, 2024) (“[T]he FBI warned us about a potential Russian disinformation operation about the Biden family and Burisma in the lead up to the 2020 election. . . . It’s since been made clear that the [New York Post] reporting was not Russian disinformation, and in retrospect, we shouldn’t have demoted the story.”); Declaration of Yoel Roth, ¶¶ 10–11, Federal Elections Comm’n MUR 7821 (Dec. 17, 2020). 174 Id.

• 42. 41 did not act to suppress the story, their failure to censor it would threaten their relationship with a potential Biden-Harris Administration in 2021 and beyond. This censorship of true election-related material denied millions of voters access to crucial information as they cast their vote for president. When the Post article came out nearly three weeks before Election Day, early and mail-in voting had already opened in many states. According to public reporting, between October 14—the day the Post published its story—and October 21—the day Facebook’s demotion was finally lifted175—over 30 million Americans cast their ballots in the election.176 Roughly one-fifth of all votes in the 2020 presidential election were cast during the week that Facebook censored an article about the Biden family’s involvement in an influence-peddling scheme with foreign powers.177 This story was particularly relevant to voters making a decision about who to trust in the Oval Office. And, to add to the potential significance of Big Tech’s decision to censor the most important story of the election, the outcome of the 2020 election was fewer than forty-five thousand votes—just 0.1 percent of the votes cast during the time Facebook censored the story.178 A. Big Tech quickly censored the true New York Post story, believing it was “exactly” what the FBI had warned about for months. The technical and policy teams within the platforms who had been meeting with the FBI immediately recognized the October 14 Post story as “exactly” the one the FBI had been warning about in detail. 179 Contemporaneous internal messages among Facebook employees show that the company’s first reaction was to suspect a Russian hack-and-leak operation. For example: • 8:37 AM ET: “About what we expected in the hack/leak department […] it’s pretty much exactly what we pregamed.” 180 • 8:42 AM ET: “It looks like exactly the hack/leak scenario we’d expected.” 181 • 9:06 AM ET: “Can we check with FBI Delaware if they have anything on this […] Article claims that FBI has had the HDD [hard drive] since December.” 182 • 9:09 AM ET: “Exact content expected for hack and leak.” 183 175 Transcribed Interview of Nick Clegg, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 1, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 123. 176 Brittany Renee Mayes et al., The U.S. hit 73% of 2016 voting before Election Day, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2020); Catherine Park, More than 14M Americans have voted early in 2020 presidential election, data shows, FOX 10 PHOENIX (Oct. 14, 2020); James M. Lindsay, The 2020 Election by the Numbers, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Dec. 15, 2020). 177 Id. 177 Brittany Renee Mayes et al., The U.S. hit 73% of 2016 voting before Election Day, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2020); Catherine Park, More than 14M Americans have voted early in 2020 presidential election, data shows, FOX 10 PHOENIX (Oct. 14, 2020). 178 Paul Waldman, We came much closer to an election catastrophe than many realize, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2020). 179 See, e.g., Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 8:42 a.m.), Ex. 5. 180 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 8:37 a.m.), see Ex. 4. 181 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 8:42 a.m.), see Ex. 5. 182 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:06 a.m.), see Ex. 6. 183 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:09 a.m.), see Ex. 7.

• 43. 42 • 9:10 AM ET: “Right on schedule.” 184 • 9:14 AM ET: “[Facebook employee] is not in touch with the FBI on this. I’ll connect with Maryland and [Facebook employee] will raise at the FITF meeting today.” 185 • 9:33 AM ET: “FYI. Our legal team is reaching out to FBI on this.” 186 • 10:40 AM ET: “We’re enqueuing the content with demotion and doing outreach to 3PFCs. No updated info from FBI, no outreach from the Biden campaign.” 187 • 10:55 AM ET: “is this the Oct surprise everyone was waiting for?” 188 • 11:11 AM ET: “482 hours to first polls close…” 189 “Exact content expected for hack and leak . . . Right on schedule.” —Oct. 14, 2020 internal messages among Facebook personnel Documents show that Facebook employees thought the story was “about what we expected in the hack/leak department,” but many also realized that there was “[n]o where [sic] near enough evidence to determine this is ‘part of a foreign govt influence op’ . . . other then [sic] circumstantial instinct.” 190 Meta’s President of Global Affairs Nick Clegg testified to the Committee and Select Subcommittee that the “team was very anxious to take a rapid decision,” and that the company had been preparing for “the risk of foreign interference” and for “hackand-leak operations” for some time.191 184 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:10 a.m.), see Ex. 7. 185 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:14 a.m.), see Ex. 6. 186 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:33 a.m.), see Ex. 8. 187 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 10:40 a.m.), see Ex. 7. 188 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 10:55 a.m.), see Ex. 107. 189 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 11:11 a.m.), see Ex. 9. 190 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 8:37 a.m.), see Ex. 4; see also Internal Facebook Hack/Leak Policy Assessment (Oct. 20, 2020), Ex. 102. 191 Transcribed Interview of Nick Clegg, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 1, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 123.

• 44. 43 “But it’s pretty much exactly what we pregamed” —Oct. 14, 2020 internal messages among Facebook personnel

• 45. 44 As confusion reigned, platforms immediately reached out to the FBI. For example, Facebook’s law enforcement outreach team contacted the FBI’s Baltimore field office, which was leading the Hunter Biden investigation.192 Critically, many of them had a prescheduled FITF meeting on the calendar for that day. 193 Internally, Facebook employees said that information from the FITF “would have huge implications on our next steps.”194 “[L]ooking at the calendar today, I see the FITF meeting. . . . Think we want to get more info on the email leak in the NY Post from today.” —Oct. 14, 2020 internal messages among Facebook personnel As Big Tech platforms began assessing how to implement their content moderation policies, including their newly updated hacked materials policies, they preemptively censored the story. Lacking evidence of a hack and leak, Facebook did not apply its newly developed hackand-leak policy, and instead elected to contort its general misinformation policies to apply to the 192 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:14 a.m.), see Ex. 104. 193 See, e.g., Emails among Elvis Chan and Google personnel (Sept. 29, 2020, 11:04 a.m.), Ex. 40; Emails among Elvis Chan and Facebook personnel (Oct. 4, 2020, 2:31 p.m.), Ex. 16; see also Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 12:32 p.m.), Ex. 103; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 12:35 p.m.), Ex. 103; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020), Ex. 56; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020), Ex. 108. 194 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 1:19 p.m.); see Ex. 109.

• 46. 45 New York Post story. 195 This meant that Facebook took two steps “in the ensuing hour or two” after the Post article was published: (1) it manually flagged the article for review by fact checkers, or enqueued it, and (2) manually buried the story in users’ feeds, or demoted it, by 50 percent for seven days.196 Notably, Facebook’s automated processes were not triggered—the article was manually targeted for demotion and fact-checking by decision-makers on the Trust and Safety team.197 “The difficult issue is that the demotion was NOT automatic (we manually demoted it).” —Oct. 14, 2020 internal messages between Vice President of Global Public Policy Joel Kaplan told then-Vice President of Global Affairs Nick Clegg regarding Facebook’s censorship of the New York Post story Twitter, in contrast, decided to apply the company’s hacked materials policies despite the lack of specific evidence of a hack and leak, and began removing content and blocking the URL. 198 This initial censorship was seen as a stopgap to help the platforms limit the spread of the story by “slowing it down so that the researchers can take time to validate and peel through the layers around the release.” 199 Limiting the spread of the story also allowed platforms to ask for more information from the FBI.200 While companies wanted to wait for any additional information from the FBI to make their ultimate plans about how to handle the story about Biden family influence peddling, they began censoring the content immediately so they did not face backlash for inaction, particularly from “the press/left.”201 195 Transcribed Interview of Meta’s Director of Global Threat Disruption, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 16, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 71-75. 196 Transcribed Interview of Nick Clegg, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 1, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 117- 123; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 11:05 a.m.), Ex. 7. 197 Id.; Messages between Nick Clegg and Joel Kaplan (Oct. 14, 2020), see Ex. 101; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 12:54 p.m.), see Ex. 9; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 5:25 p.m.), see Ex. 9 198 Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X (Dec. 2, 2022, 6:34 p.m.), https://x.com/mtaibbi/status/1598822959866683394. 199 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 11:09 p.m.), see Ex. 105. 200 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 1:33 p.m.), see Ex. 106. 201 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 6:26 p.m.), see Ex. 115.

• 47. 46 B. Big Tech reached out to the FBI and the FBI hid key information. While social media companies scrambled internally to analyze the possible foreign influence risks of the Post article, they turned to the FBI with questions. After all, the platforms had met with the FITF about foreign interference and potential hack-and-leak operations dozens of times throughout 2020 in anticipation of just such an event. In light of this practice of information sharing, the social media companies thought the FBI would provide details to help the platforms determine which of their content moderation policies to apply. By happenstance, the FBI had at least three meetings with social media companies already scheduled for October 14, 2020—two bilateral FITF meetings (one with Facebook and one with Twitter) and a USG-Industry meeting—which provided the social media platforms with opportunities to directly confront the FBI for more information.202 1. The Twitter-FITF Bilateral Meeting The first meeting occurred between the FITF and Twitter.203 An FBI analyst present at the meeting testified that Twitter’s Head of Trust and Safety, Yoel Roth, began the meeting by informing the FBI that Twitter had “seen the New York Post story about Hunter Biden’s laptop,” assessed it “as a Russian disinformation effort,” and planned to “suppress the story.”204 The analyst then testified that after an “awkward pause,” the FITF’s Russia Unit Chief made a few general comments about Russian disinformation and hack-and-leak threats, after which the analyst jumped in and, referencing the Hunter Biden laptop, said “that’s part of a separate matter.”205 However, according to testimony from two other senior FBI employees with knowledge of the meeting, that FBI analyst actually responded by saying something to the effect of “the laptop is real.” 206 The analyst was quickly stopped by an FBI lawyer from the Office of 202 USG-Industry Meeting invitation (Oct. 14, 2020, 6:00 p.m.), see Ex. 27; Email from Elvis Chan to Google personnel (Sept. 29, 2020, 11:04 a.m.), see Ex. 40; Scheduling emails between FBI and Facebook personnel (Oct. 4, 2020, 2:31 p.m.), see Ex. 16; see also Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 12:57 p.m.), Ex. 79. Though there were four meetings scheduled for October 14, 2020, witness testimony and documents containing contemporaneous notes obtained by the Committee have confirmed so far that at least three took place: Twitter-FITF, Facebook-FITF, and the USG-Industry meeting. It is unclear whether the Google-FITF meeting took place and, if so, whether anyone from Google asked whether the laptop was real. 203 Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 65-80; see also Transcribed Interview of Laura Dehmlow, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 17, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 29-33; Internal FBI meeting notes (Oct. 14, 2020), Ex. 44. 204 Transcribed Interview of an FBI Criminal Investigative Division Analyst, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 23, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 32-33, 45. 205 Id. at 45; The separate matter referenced was the Hunter Biden investigation. While the analyst who confirmed the existence of the laptop in the Twitter-FITF meeting had known about the Hunter Biden investigation for several months, he learned that the FBI possessed Hunter Biden’s authenticated laptop only on the morning of October 14. Shortly after the Post story broke, a colleague at a nearby desk told the analyst and others that he was surprised to see the laptop’s contents in a media report because the laptop was part of the Hunter Biden investigation, which the colleague oversaw as a Program Manager covering the Baltimore Field Office. Id. at 28. 206 Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 66-67; Transcribed Interview of Laura Dehmlow, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 17, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 29-33.

• 48. 47 General Counsel, who said “no further comment” and shut down all subsequent conversation on the topic.207 In her interview before the Committee, Laura Dehmlow explained: Q. Are you familiar with the October 2020 New York Post story on Hunter Biden’s laptop? A. I am. Q. Do you recall whether any of these social media companies you were meeting with asked you any questions about it? A. I do. Q. And what is your recollection? Who – A. So I remember having a conversation with or being involved in a conversation with Twitter, and I honestly can’t recall if this was repeated to me – I might have been a few minutes late to the meeting – or if – or if I was – I actually overheard it. But it was – it was relayed to me later that somebody from Twitter – I don’t recall who. I’m not sure who. Somebody from Twitter essentially asked whether the laptop was real. And one of the FBI folks who was on the call did confirm that, yes, it was before another participant jumped in and said no further comment. *** Q. Was this individual affiliated with FITF? A. Again, it was somebody from the Criminal Investigative Division who is embedded with us. Q. So yes? A. Yes. Q. And did this question occur in the context of a bilateral meeting? A. It did. Q. Do you recall how soon after the story broke that this meeting occurred? A. I don’t remember. I believe it was the same week, but I don’t remember the specific day. 207 Id.

• 49. 48 Q. On that call with that IA [Intelligence Analyst] who’s in the Criminal Investigative Division, that was the individual who said, “yes, the laptop is authentic”? Is that correct? A. I don’t believe it was that specific. Again, I don’t recall hearing the conversation itself. I know it was relayed to me afterwards. But my understanding is that we confirmed that, yes, the laptop was a real laptop. Q. And then you said another FBI individual came on and said, “No further comment.” A. Yes. Q. Is that correct? A. That’s correct. Q. Who was that individual? A. It was some -- it was one of our lawyers who was on the call.208 The then-Russia Unit Chief of the FITF provided similar testimony to the Committee. He explained: Q. During the FITF-Twitter call on the 14th, was there any discussion about the New York Post story or Hunter Biden's laptop? *** A. I recall that when the question came up, an intelligence analyst assigned to the Criminal Investigative Division said something to the effect of, “Yes, the laptop is real.” And then I believe it was an OGC attorney assigned to the FITF stepped in and said, “We will not comment further on this topic.” 209 2. The FBI’s Internal Deliberations FBI personnel testified that after the Twitter bilateral meeting, the FITF had internal discussions about how to respond to future questions about the contents of Hunter Biden’s abandoned laptop and the Post article. 210 Various members of the FITF were involved in these 208 Transcribed Interview of Laura Dehmlow, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 17, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 29-31. 209 Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 66-67. 210 Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 65-80; see also Transcribed Interview of Laura Dehmlow, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 17, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 29-33.

• 50. 49 conversations, and the FITF Section Chief was made aware.211 The FITF decided on this course of action because the laptop was a part of an ongoing investigation.212 The then-Russia Unit Chief of the FITF testified: Q. Was there a decision made during these internal deliberations about how the FBI would respond going forward to future questions? A. The characterization that is – it’s true, we absolutely talked about it, but more to firm up with everyone that it’s a longstanding policy. It wasn’t like this is something that wasn’t known, that we don’t talk about ongoing investigations. So there was sort of that reiteration of, okay, if they ask about ongoing investigations, we don’t talk about ongoing investigations. So from that point forward, again, we reiterated that it will be “no comment” when something like that comes up. So as you can imagine, that kind of continued that way.213 For most of the Congress, when the Committee asked for the name of the FBI employee who made the decision that the FBI would have no comment to the social media companies going forward, the Justice Department forbid FBI witnesses from providing it. For example, during FITF Section Chief Dehmlow’s transcribed interview, she testified that she knew the identity of the FBI employee but the Justice Department prohibited her from disclosing the employee’s name: Q. Who made the decision that the FBI would have no comment to the social media companies going forward? DOJ Counsel. So I want to be clear. Ms. Dehmlow, obviously, can answer the question as long as it doesn’t get into internal deliberations or advice from a lawyer or anything. A. Yeah, and, unfortunately I can’t answer that with any further detail on that advice. Q. So you can’t tell us who made the decision? 211 Id. 212 Id. 213 Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 78-79.

• 51. 50 A. I can say there were internal deliberations with a number of parties, and then -- but I can’t get into that further.214 3. The Facebook-FITF Bilateral Meeting Following the FITF’s internal deliberations after the FITF-Twitter bilateral meeting, the FITF held a prescheduled bilateral meeting with Facebook and a full USG-Industry meeting, during which the FBI would not officially comment on questions about the laptop or the Post article. 215 The article was brought up in both meetings, but the FBI’s “no comment” response ended the discussion and the meetings continued with other matters.216 FITF Section Chief Dehmlow testified to the Committee and Select Subcommittee: Q When the Facebook employee asked the question, do you recall exactly what they asked? A. I don’t. Q. Do you know if it was about the laptop? A. Yes. It was essentially whether or not we – yes, it was something about the laptop. I don’t remember – I know that my answer was “no comment” because – and the question doesn’t stick in my mind because it was something about the laptop. And I said, “No comment.” Again, that was not my decision. It wasn’t my final call. There were other agency, other departments, other FBI equities at stake, investigative equities, and so pretty typical for us to come to that conclusion.217 Through unofficial FBI channels, Facebook personnel were able to obtain more information than the “no comment” they were offered in the FITF bilateral meeting. According to internal Facebook messages, an FBI official told Facebook that the laptop existed and that it was “part of a criminal matter.” 218 214 Transcribed Interview of Laura Dehmlow, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 17, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 33. 215 Id. at 65-80; See also Transcribed Interview of Laura Dehmlow, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 17, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 29-33. 216 Id.; see also Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:05 a.m.), Ex. 56; Microsoft internal meeting notes (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:27 p.m.), Ex. 3. 217 Transcribed Interview of Laura Dehmlow, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 17, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 36. 218 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:45 p.m.), see Ex. 7; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 8:23 p.m.), see Ex. 7; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 1:50 p.m.), see Ex. 108. The Russia Unit Chief of the FITF testified to the Committee that he did not know who at the FBI shared with Facebook that the laptop was part of a criminal matter. See Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 155.

• 52. 51 “[T]hey did confirm that FBI has the laptop and it’s being review [sic] ‘as part of a criminal matter’” —Oct. 14, 2020 internal messages among Facebook personnel Despite the FBI’s limited revelations as well as obvious facts, such as the failure of the Biden campaign to deny the laptop’s authenticity, Facebook still chose to censor the Post story about Biden family influence peddling.219 “The fact that the FBI apparently has the laptop[] may explain why no one in the Biden campaign is denying the authenticity.” —Oct. 14, 2020 internal message from Facebook’s Vice President of Global Public Policy Joel Kaplan to Facebook employees 219 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 8:23 p.m.), see Ex. 7.

• 53. 52 4. The USG-Industry Meeting The laptop again came up during the USG-Industry meeting scheduled for the afternoon of October 14. 220 Like he did at the start of the Twitter-FITF meeting earlier that day, Twitter’s Head of Trust and Safety, Yoel Roth, once again shared that Twitter assessed the Post story to be Russian disinformation and intended to censor it. 221 Afterwards, Elvis Chan “pitched the response over” to the same analyst who had confirmed the laptop’s existence in the Twitter-FITF meeting; that analyst then responded in this USG-Industry meeting “no comment.”222 Notably, the analyst’s testimony contradicts Chan’s testimony from his Murthy v. Missouri deposition, in which Chan said he “was confident that [he] was not a party to any meeting with social media companies where Hunter Biden was discussed outside of the [Facebook-FITF bilateral meeting].” 223 Likewise, Chan’s testimony that he had “no internal knowledge of [the Hunter Biden] investigation” was contradicted by the analyst, who testified to the Committee that he messaged Chan and “mentioned that there was an ongoing investigation” on the morning of October 14. 224 The Justice Department continues to prohibit Chan from testifying to the Committee and Select Subcommittee. 225 “FBI tipped us all off last week that this Burisma story was likely to emerge” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal Microsoft notes on USG-Industry meeting 220 Microsoft internal meeting notes (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:27 p.m.), see Ex. 3. 221 Transcribed Interview of an FBI Criminal Investigative Division Analyst, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 23, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 107-108. 222 Transcribed Interview of an FBI Criminal Investigative Division Analyst, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 23, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 38. 223 Murthy v. Missouri, No. 3:22-cv-01213, 2023 WL 43352270 (WD La. July 4, 2023) (Deposition of Elvis Chan), at 216.; see also Rep. Jim Jordan (@Jim_Jordan), X (Aug. 7, 2023, 10:11 a.m.), https://x.com/Jim_Jordan/status/1688553364211056640 (Facebook Files Part 4) (identifying other contradictions between Elvis Chan’s deposition testimony and documents obtained by the Committee and Select Subcommittee). 224 Id. at 214; Transcribed Interview of an FBI Criminal Investigative Division Analyst, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 23, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 47. 225 See House Judiciary GOP (@JudiciaryGOP), X (Sept. 15, 2023, 4:17 p.m.), https://x.com/JudiciaryGOP/status/1702778803037057503.

• 54. 53 In minutes from this USG-Industry meeting, describing the discussion of the New York Post story with the FBI, Microsoft wrote that the “FBI tipped us all off last week that this Burisma story was likely to emerge, and today’s call indicated that.” 226 5. The FITF’s Follow-Up Discussions The FITF’s Russia Unit Chief testified that during the course of the FITF’s meetings with social media platforms on October 14, 2020, he felt there was significant confusion around the Post article and that it “felt necessary to reach out to some of the more major companies and have a follow-up discussion with them,” particularly in light of the FBI analyst’s apparent confirmation of the laptop’s existence to Twitter.227 The Russia Unit Chief testified that he had a joint “follow-up discussion” with one representative each from Twitter, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft.228 In this meeting, he shared a prepared statement that he had “cleared” with superiors while “trying to skirt multiple policies and be within bounds legally.” 229 The statement, he later explained to the Committee and Select Subcommittee, “was something to the effect of: The FBI has nothing in its possession to suggest that the laptop is a hack or a leak.” 230 The Russia Unit Chief also testified that he rebuffed any potential follow-up questions with a response of “I’ve told you everything I can tell you on this matter.” 231 He testified that while the FBI “had more information” than just the fact that the laptop was not the product of a hack and leak, he could not share more due to the FBI’s policies.232 He explained: Q. After these FITF meetings take place, do you recall any follow-up outreach to you or other members of the FITF with the social media companies asking for more information? A. Yes. Specifically, I felt that there was some confusion after this meeting or around that time because of that sort of comment that was made outside of policy, and then sort of having to cut it off. Again, like, when we normally answer “no comment,” we can’t say, “because we have an open investigation,” because that, in and of itself, is revealing that we have an investigation. So in this case, there was some confusion and I felt necessary to reach out to some of the more major companies and have a follow-up discussion with them. Q. Which companies did you reach out to? 226 Microsoft internal meeting notes (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:27 p.m.), Ex. 3. 227 Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 83. 228 Id. 229 Id. at 84. 230 Id.; see also Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 1:41 p.m.), Ex. 109; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 18, 2020, 2:05 p.m.), Ex. 110. 231 Id. 232 Id. at 85.

• 55. 54 A. I don’t remember all of them. I’m pretty sure there was – I usually – I remember that it was, like, one person from each company, and I’m pretty sure Facebook, Google, and Twitter were represented. Q. Did you do – A. There may have been one or two other companies, but I don’t remember. Maybe Microsoft. But I don’t want to speculate, like, exactly which companies were sort of deemed pertinent or that we should give them somewhat of an update. *** Chairman Jordan. What did you tell them? A. So I told them -- I cleared a phrase, trying to skirt multiple policies and be within bounds legally and within policy, of what I could communicate to them, and came up with a phrase that I could share. And the phrase, I don’t have it verbatim, but it was something to the effect of: The FBI has nothing in its possession to suggest that the laptop is a hack or a leak. And what I intended to communicate with that was that we did not know that the laptop was hacked. And I was very deliberate with my words because there’s all sorts of things I could add that would either indicate that it’s an ongoing investigation or somehow communicate to them that I know more than I did. So at that time what I knew was the laptop was not hacked, because we had it in our possession. So I was very deliberate in that statement. Obviously there was follow-on questions. We expected there would be follow-on questions. So also came up with sort of a follow-on statement. And, again, I don’t know this verbatim, but something to the effect of: I’ve told you everything I can tell you on this matter. Sort of beyond “no comment” but basically no comment otherwise. So obviously that phrase of we have nothing in FBI holdings to suggest that the laptop is hack-and-leak generally communicates that, as much as I can tell them, to try to clear up at least that element of the situation.233 The FITF’s Russia Unit Chief testified that he felt an especially strong need to convey this statement to the major social media platforms because of the confusion from the Twitter233 Id. at 83-84 (emphasis added).

• 56. 55 FITF meeting, in which an FBI analyst appeared to confirm the existence of the laptop with a statement “made outside of policy” before his superiors intervened.234 Had the analyst not spoken out of turn, it is unlikely that the FBI ever would have told the platforms anything about the true nature of the Hunter Biden laptop on October 14.235 Ultimately, in response to questions from Big Tech platforms—who had been primed for moths to view this exact story as a Russian operation—about whether the Post article was a hack-and-leak operation, the FBI merely responded with “no comment” and “[t]he FBI has nothing in its possession to suggest that the laptop is a hack or a leak.” 236 The FBI gave these answers even though it had possession of the laptop and had authenticated its contents and “knew [that] the laptop was not hacked.” 237 C. Despite a lack of evidence, Big Tech continued to censor the story because of concerns about a potential Biden-Harris Administration. Even after meeting with the FBI, social media platforms—particularly Facebook— doubled down on their decision to censor the New York Post story about Biden family influence peddling. While the FBI clarified that it had no specific evidence of a Russian hack-and-leak operation, it failed to disclose that it possessed and had authenticated the laptop—a key fact that likely would have ended any justification for censorship. Instead, because the FBI’s statements on the laptop failed to clarify the situation, and because the platforms knew that their “calls on this could colour the way an incoming Biden administration views us more than almost anything else,” 238 major platforms, such as Facebook, censored the story. 1. Facebook After the initial steps to apply Facebook’s misinformation policies by demoting and enqueueing the Post story for fact checking, a broader debate emerged on whether to invoke Facebook’s newly developed hacked material policies. This provision required there to be evidence of a hack, but contained an exception allowing materials considered “newsworthy” to remain on the site. 239 Many Facebook employees were initially convinced that the article was the product of a hack and leak, but they had differing degrees of confidence. One employee wrote in an internal message that the story was the “exact content expected for hack-and-leak, but sounds like so far, there is not much for us to do: 1. No evidence of foreign interference operation[,] 2. Coming directly from press[.] Sounds like next steps are to see if FBI contacts have any context for us and to wait.” 240 234 Id. at 83. 235 Id. at 83-85. 236 Id. at 83-84 237 Id. 238 Messages between Nick Clegg and Joel Kaplan (Oct. 14, 2020), see Ex. 101. 239 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 7:03 p.m.), see Ex. 7. 240 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 9:09 a.m.), see Ex. 7.

• 57. 56 “Exact content expected for hack and leak . . . Right on schedule.” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal messages among Facebook personnel Others turned immediately to the hack-and-leak framework as Facebook contemplated a response. In a separate message thread, one Facebook employee wrote “(1) we need to assess whether the content violates our policies against hacked materials (sounds like that is how Twitter is handling) and (2) is the content newsworthy?” 241 Another Facebook employee 241 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 2:06 p.m.), see Ex. 9.

• 58. 57 responded, after conducting an analysis, that the content “violates hacked policy,” subject to a determination of whether the content met the newsworthiness exception.242 “[W]e need to assess whether the content violates our policies against hacked materials[.]” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal messages among Facebook personnel Facebook employees determined what qualified for the newsworthy exception on a caseby-case basis by “weighing the public interest in seeing content against the risk of harm.” 243 Stories that were uninteresting or harmful “would be removed,” while high-interest or low-harm stories “would either stay up or be labeled, depending on what [Facebook] decide[d].” 244 One employee wrote that “it seems like the vast majority of the content obtained from the laptop of a candidate’s child would not be newsworthy,” 245 and another concurred, writing that “both [public interest and harm] are pretty low here. It’s not really news that Hunter Biden has done drugs or engaged in other bad behavior.” 246 Others in the company disagreed with this assessment. Joel Kaplan, Facebook’s Vice President of Global Public Policy, in particular, pushed back, writing: “Years of stories about the adult family members of Presidents would suggest that that content is newsworthy.” 247 “Years of stories about the adult family members of Presidents would suggest that that content is newsworthy” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal message from Joel Kaplan to Facebook personnel 242 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 2:55 p.m.), see Ex. 9. 243 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 7:44 p.m.), see Ex. 7. 244 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 7:03 p.m.), see Ex. 7. 245 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 7:07 p.m.), see Ex. 7. 246 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 7:44 p.m.), see Ex. 7. 247 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 7:17 p.m.), see Ex. 7.

• 59. 58 The Facebook employees also debated whether Hunter Biden could be considered a “prominent person in public life”—another consideration in Facebook’s policy on hacked materials.248 Many Facebook employees argued that Hunter Biden did not meet that threshold as the son of a presidential candidate who was not a public figure in his own right. 249 Again, Joel Kaplan pushed back, writing: “I don’t really buy how the adult son of a VP who is being accused of influence peddling for a foreign company is not considered a prominent person in public life.” 250 “I don’t really buy how the adult son of a VP who is being accused of influence peddling for a foreign company is not considered a prominent person in public life.” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal message from Joel Kaplan to Facebook personnel Before the newsworthy analysis became determinative, though, Facebook would have had to conclude that the contents of the Post article were the result of a hack. The company quickly determined that it did not have evidence to conclude that the Post story was the result of a hack. 251 Because of the lack of evidence of a hack and leak, and because the FBI told Facebook that it also did not have any evidence to suggest such a conclusion, Facebook could not censor the story under its hacked materials policy.252 Instead, the platform contorted its misinformation framework to trigger an automatic seven-day demotion while the story was sent to third-party factcheckers for their review. “Demotion is an appropriate and effective mitigation for what we’re almost certainly observing here,” one Facebook employee wrote in an internal chat. 253 “We’re slowing it down so that the researchers can take time to validate and peel through the layers around the release.” 254 Soon after Facebook’s decision to demote and enqueue content concerning Hunter Biden’s laptop and Biden family influence peddling, key decision-makers within the company began to express significant concerns with how the platform handled the situation and the public attention it was receiving. In an internal message thread, Vice President of Global Public Policy Joel Kaplan told then-Vice President of Global Affairs Nick Clegg that the company’s handling 248 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 7:46 p.m.), see Ex. 7. 249 Id. 250 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 7:48 p.m.), see Ex. 7. 251 Transcribed Interview of Meta’s Director of Global Threat Disruption, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 16, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 71-75. 252 Id. 253 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 11:09 p.m.), Ex. 105; see also Internal messages among Facebook employees (Oct. 14, 2020, 1:00 p.m.), Ex. 9. 254 Id.

• 60. 59 of the Post article had been “outrageous.” 255 These concerns were shared at lower levels of the company: another employee wrote, “I think everyone was trigger happy about this type of content being leaked, and made decisions that should not have been made individually and without consultation.” 256 Facebook employees were so “trigger happy” because “this was the content that people were most primed by LE [law enforcement], etc. to expect in a hack/leak.” 257 The FBI’s prebunking had worked. “This was the content that people were most primed by LE, etc. to expect in a hack/leak” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal messages among Facebook personnel The internal conflict over Facebook’s initial demotion of the content spurred discussion of potential alternative courses of action. In his transcribed interview before the Committee and Select Subcommittee, Meta’s President of Global Affairs Nick Clegg testified that there were suggestions to shorten the amount of time the story was demoted for from seven days to five or six, especially “in the absence of any fact checker finding fault with the content.” 258 Clegg testified that COO Sheryl Sandberg was in favor of demoting the content for the full seven days, arguing that the company had already taken the action and should not reverse course; meanwhile CEO Mark Zuckerberg “was keen that we sort of cleaved as closely as possible” to the company’s standards, but “deferred very much” to Clegg.259 In an internal message thread, Facebook’s Vice President of Global Public Policy Joel Kaplan and then-Vice President of Global Affairs Nick Clegg discussed other specific concerns with Facebook’s handling of content related to allegations of Biden family influence peddling. Kaplan highlighted a perceived double-standard: Facebook allowed leaked content that was politically damaging to one party, like the New York Times story about President Trump’s tax 255 Messages between Nick Clegg and Joel Kaplan (Oct. 14, 2020), see Ex. 101. 256 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 1:39 p.m.), see Ex. 115. 257 Id. 258 Transcribed Interview of Nick Clegg, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 1, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 124. 259 Id. at 123-126.

• 61. 60 returns, while demoting leaked content like the Post story that might be damaging to the other party. 260 “We did not do this when the NYT [dumped] [sic] an expose on Trump’s tax returns citing leaked documents that they wouldn’t even share.” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal messages between Nick Clegg and Joel Kaplan Similarly, as reflected in internal communications obtained by the Committee and Select Subcommittee, Facebook’s communications team understood that the traditional media employed a double-standard where Big Tech would face criticism not based on whether it fairly enforced its policies, but only on whether its enforcement hurt or helped President Trump. 261 As one Facebook Communications Vice President wrote as the company decided whether and how to censor the New York Post story: “Golden Rule: The Press is only as good to you as you are bad to Trump.”262 “Golden Rule: The Press is only as good to you as you are bad to Trump.” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal messages from Facebook Communications Vice President 260 Messages between Nick Clegg and Joel Kaplan (Oct. 14, 2020), see Ex. 101. 261 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 10:51 p.m.), see Ex. 115. 262 Id.

• 62. 61 Internal Facebook messages also suggest that Facebook’s leadership decided to continue to demote the New York Post story because of public pressure and concerns about how changing course would affect the company’s relationship with a potential Biden-Harris Administration. In the message thread, Kaplan told Clegg that the platform needed to “decide whether to undo this demotion” but that “Unwinding will likely leak and be a story (conversely, doing things that might be perceived as anti-conservative, like demoting the content, never seem to leak).” 263 Clegg agreed and responded by saying “unwinding it now will unfortunately create more headaches than it’s worth.” 264 “Unwinding it now will unfortunately create more headaches than it’s worth.” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal messages between Nick Clegg and Joel Kaplan Later in the message thread Clegg recognized that Facebook’s “calls on this could colour the way an incoming Biden administration views us more than anything else.” 265 “Obviously, our calls on this could colour the way an incoming Biden administration views us more than almost anything else” —Oct. 14, 2020, internal messages between Nick Clegg and Joel Kaplan Facebook seemed to be more concerned about its relationship with a potential BidenHarris Administration than protecting the free speech of its users on its platform. So, while the FBI had confirmed that there was no evidence that the laptop was a Russian influence operation, Facebook continued with its decision to reduce the story by 50 percent on its platform for seven 263 Messages between Nick Clegg and Joel Kaplan (Oct. 14, 2020), see Ex. 101. 264 Id. 265 Id.

• 63. 62 days.266 During these seven days of Facebook censorship, over 30 million Americans voted in the 2020 presidential election—representing nearly one-fifth of the total votes cast.267 After nearly four years, in August 2024, CEO Mark Zuckerberg told the Committee and Select Subcommittee in a letter that Facebook “shouldn’t have demoted the story.”268 2. Twitter The Twitter Files, a series of reports authored by independent journalists and released shortly after Elon Musk acquired the company, show that Twitter quickly began applying its hacked materials policy to the Post article after its release. 269 Twitter’s enforcement actions included suppressing the article, removing links, applying safety warnings, and blocking the ability to send it via direct message.270 Twitter even locked then-White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany out of her account for tweeting about the Post article and prevented the Committee from tweeting a link to the Post article. 271 Despite the quick and aggressive enforcement of the hacked materials policy, decisionmakers at Twitter did have concerns about the platform’s response. Twitter’s Vice President of Global Communications asked whether Twitter could “truthfully claim that this [the Post article] is part of the [hacked materials] policy?” 272 Twitter’s Deputy General Counsel responded, acknowledging that the company probably needed “more facts to assess whether the materials were hacked,” but that “it is reasonable for us to assume that they may have been and that caution is warranted.” 273 Like Facebook, Twitter censored the story, relying on the warnings it had received from the FBI prior to the story’s publication. Some decision-makers at Twitter outright disagreed with the decision. Twitter’s former Head of Trust and Safety, Yoel Roth, testified to the Committee and Select Subcommittee that he reviewed the Post article and other relevant data, found it to be an ambiguous case, and thus “didn’t believe that the activity in question warranted enforcement under Twitter’s distribution of Hacked Materials Policy,” though he did believe the story should not be promoted.274 Mr. Roth testified to the Committee: 266 Transcribed Interview of Nick Clegg, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 1, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 117- 123; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020, 11:05 a.m.), see Ex. 7. 267 Brittany Renee Mayes et al., The U.S. hit 73% of 2016 voting before Election Day, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2020); Catherine Park, More than 14M Americans have voted early in 2020 presidential election, data shows, FOX 10 PHOENIX (Oct. 14, 2020); James M. Lindsay, The 2020 Election by the Numbers, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Dec. 15, 2020). 268 Letter from Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Meta, to Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Aug. 26, 2024). 269 Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X (Dec. 2, 2022, 6:34 p.m.), https://x.com/mtaibbi/status/1598822959866683394. 270 Id.; see also Noah Manskar, Twitter, Facebook censor Post over Hunter Biden exposé, N.Y. POST (Oct. 14, 2020). 271 Steven Nelson, WH press secretary locked out of Twitter for sharing Post’s Hunter Biden story, N.Y. POST (Oct. 14, 2020); House Judiciary GOP (@JudiciaryGOP), X (Oct. 15, 2020, 9:13 a.m.), https://x.com/JudiciaryGOP/status/1316728942523547653. 272 Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), X (Dec. 2, 2022, 6:34 p.m.), https://x.com/mtaibbi/status/1598822959866683394. 273 Id. 274 Transcribed Interview of Yoel Roth, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 1, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 29.

• 64. 63 Q. Once you found out about the story, again, to your recollection, walk me through what you did next. A. Yeah. My first step was to ask a member of my team to develop what we called a policy assessment of the situation, a brief document that compiled the available evidence about what had happened and to make a recommendation under Twitter’s rules for what the company should do. I recall the situation at that point being pretty ambiguous. There was one article or perhaps a series of articles from the New York Post discussing the incident, but there wasn’t a lot of available factual evidence at the time. And so my recollection is that the member of my team working on the policy assessment struggled to identify what the right course of action here would be. From that point, I discussed the issue with Del Harvey, who was my supervisor, and I represented to her that I didn’t believe that the activity in question warranted enforcement under Twitter’s Distribution of Hacked Materials Policy. But, based on the available evidence that seemed to indicate a laptop of unknown provenance, a laptop that potentially had been broken into and the contents of which were being divulged, I made the recommendation to my supervisor that Twitter should take steps to not recommend or amplify the circulation of this content. That is, I didn’t recommend that Twitter delete the story or block its distribution entirely, just that Twitter take steps to not actively recommend it to users, which was a content moderation action we would take in ambiguous cases. It’s my understanding that Ms. Harvey discussed that with Ms. Gadde, and the decision was communicated to me at some point in first half of the day – but I couldn’t exactly say when – that Ms. Gadde had decided that the content was a violation of Twitter’s policy and that we should enforce against it under the Distribution of Hacked Materials Policy.275 In 2023, Twitter executives testified before Congress and called the company’s treatment of the Post article a “mistake.” 276 275 Id. at 29-30. 276 Laura Romero, Former Twitter execs tell House committee that removal of Hunter Biden laptop story was a ‘mistake’, ABC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2023); see also Kelsey Vlamis, Twitter’s former trust and safety chief said it was a mistake to censor the Hunter Biden laptop story: ‘We didn’t know what to believe’, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 30, 2022).

• 65. 64 In November 2020, in the aftermath of the Post debacle, Twitter amended its policy on the distribution of hacked materials.277 First, Twitter changed the scope of the policy “to much more narrowly focus on situations in which there was a clearly confirmed hack that had taken place.” 278 Second, the platform changed the kind of enforcement action it would take against hacked materials.279 Instead of removing the content that was the result of a hack, Twitter would merely apply a label to the content with additional information.280 Finally, Twitter added considerations to the policy about what kinds of sources were distributing the content at issue.281 Twitter realized that its previous policy failed to account for mainstream media coverage of hacking stories and only focused on stopping the hackers themselves.282 The new policy would “no longer remove hacked content unless it is directly shared by hackers or those acting in concert with them.” 283 In explaining this new hacked material policy, Mr. Roth testified to the Committee: Q Okay. Did Twitter during your time there have a policy as it related to hacked materials? A. It did. Twitter had a Distribution of Hacked Materials Policy. Q. And when was that policy first developed? A. To the best of my recollection, it was developed and introduced in 2018. Q. And did it change during your time at Twitter? A. It did. The policy was substantially changed in 2020. Q. And how did it change in 2020? A. Following Twitter’s decision to restrict the New York Post’s coverage of Hunter Biden’s laptop, the company made a decision to change the scope of Hacked Materials Policy to much more narrowly focus on situations in which there was a clearly confirmed hack that had taken place and to change the remedy under the policy from being the removal of content to the application of labels that would provide additional information. Q. And when did this change occur? A. The updated policy was developed in October and November of 2020. I don’t remember exactly when it was introduced within that window. To the 277 Transcribed Interview of Yoel Roth, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 1, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 19-20. 278 Id. at 20. 279 Id. at 19-20. 280 Id. 281 Id. at 21. 282 Id. 283 Vijaya Gadde (@vijaya), X (Oct. 15, 2020, 10:06 p.m.), https://x.com/vijaya/status/1316923557268652033.

• 66. 65 best of my recollection, it would have been in October 2020, but there were public announcements from the company that would have the exact date. Q. Okay. And who at the company signed off on this change? A. The policy was developed by me and by members of my team and ultimately was signed off on by Del Harvey and by Vijaya Gadde. *** Q. Was there any part of the policy that took into account whether the source being hacked was a public filling? A. No, that was not a consideration under the policy. Q. Was there any part of the policy that covered whether the hacking itself was considered newsworthy? A. That was one of the clarifications that was made in 2020, not whether the hack itself was newsworthy but the sources covering the content. In the initial drafting of the policy, Twitter had been focused primarily on the activity that we saw in 2016, which were Russian hackers sharing it themselves. The hackers created Twitter accounts in their own personas and were directly laundering the content on social media using aliases like Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks. And so we were focused on restricting that kind of direct distribution. Twitter didn’t consider the possibility that the hack would take place or – excuse me – the disclosure of the hack would take place through a mainstream media outlet.284 But this policy update did not change the damage that had occurred: Twitter censored the article detailing the Biden family’s influence peddling less than one month before an election, in part because Twitter had been primed by the FBI to expect the story would be part of a Russian hack-and-leak operation. 3. Other companies The FBI’s prebunking efforts notwithstanding, other social media platforms did not follow Facebook and Twitter’s lead and came to different conclusions about how to act in response to the New York Post article. In testimony before the Committee and Select Subcommittee, a member of Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) explained that shortly after the story was published, he and his 284 Transcribed Interview of Yoel Roth, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 1, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 19-21.

• 67. 66 team conducted an analysis of whether the article or laptop were part of a Russian hack-and-leak operation.285 He testified that TAG “did not find any evidence that it was part of a foreign hackand-leak operation.” 286 Accordingly, YouTube “largely did nothing” to censor the Post story, per public reporting.287 The TAG member also testified that he consulted with other contacts in the industry, such as Yoel Roth at Twitter and personnel at Apple, to see if they had any evidence that the content was the result of a hack and leak, but found that those platforms had no “direct evidence of specific foreign involvement or hack-and-leak.” 288 Google’s TAG staffer testified: Q. Once [the New York Post] story was released, did your team conduct an assessment of whether materials from the story of the laptop were part of an either Russian hack-and-leak or hack-and-dump operation? A. Yes. Q. And what were your team’s findings? A. My team’s findings was that we did not find any evidence that it was part of a foreign hack-and-leak operation. Q. The story came out on October 14, 2020, early in the morning. . . . [D]o you recall how soon from when the story first broke – at least in the United States, it received a good amount of news coverage – from how soon the story first broke to when your team first began its assessment? A. Pretty quickly. Q. Same day? A. Same day or day after probably. Q. And then how long did it take your team to reach an initial assessment? A. I’d say we did an initial assessment based on the information we had access to within a few – within hours.289 After completing its analysis, TAG communicated the finding to Google’s Vice President of Trust and Safety.290 The TAG staffer testified that later the same day, he was asked to join a call with the Vice President of Trust and Safety and “a number of other VPs and some lawyers 285 Transcribed Interview of the Senior Director of Google’s Threat Analysis Group, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 19, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 23-26. 286 Id. 287 A Misinformation Test for Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020); see also Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Hunter Biden story was a test for tech platforms. They barely passed, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2020). 288 Transcribed Interview of the Senior Director of Google’s Threat Analysis Group, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 19, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 28. 289 Id. at 23-24. 290 Id. at 24.

• 68. 67 from various products,” including YouTube, to provide a short verbal brief on TAG’s understanding of the article and to answer a few questions.291 According to his testimony, questions during this call revolved around whether TAG had found evidence of a foreign hack and leak or heard of any evidence from industry partners.292 The TAG staffer testified that he had not found any direct evidence of a foreign hack-and-leak operation, nor had he received any from industry contacts at other companies.293 He testified that “the only thing I heard was speculation. I hadn’t heard any evidence” from others in the industry.294 Today, Facebook and Twitter point to the FBI’s warnings when explaining their censorship decisions.295 But other companies’ approach shows that even with the FBI’s prebunking, if Facebook and others had followed their proper protocols, the New York Post story should have never been censored. 296 Because the FBI primed platforms to look out for a Russian hack and leak targeting the Bidens and Burisma, when the Post story was published, some platforms jumped at the chance to censor it and failed to follow all of their applicable policies or the evidence. “[T]rigger happy” companies like Facebook and Twitter “made decisions that should not have been made individually and without consultation.” 297 D. FBI continued to withhold information as Big Tech continued to reach out. In the days following the publication of the Post article on Biden family influence peddling, social media platforms continued to seek new information or additional clarity from the FBI. Despite repeated requests, the FBI continually refused to provide more details. 291 Id. at 26. 292 Id. at 28. 293 Id. 294 Id. 295 See, e.g., Letter from Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Meta, to Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Aug. 26, 2024) (“[T]he FBI warned us about a potential Russian disinformation operation about the Biden family and Burisma in the lead up to the 2020 election. . . . It’s since been made clear that the [New York Post] reporting was not Russian disinformation, and in retrospect, we shouldn’t have demoted the story.”); Declaration of Yoel Roth, ¶¶ 10–11, Federal Elections Comm’n MUR 7821 (Dec. 17, 2020). 296 See, e.g., Transcribed Interview of Google’s Director of Global Elections Integrity, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 22, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 72. While Alphabet did not censor the Post story, they have generally been just as censorious as other platforms. The Committee and Select Subcommittee have demonstrated that in 2021, YouTube altered its content moderation policies at the behest of the Biden-Harris Administration. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 118TH CONG., THE CENSORSHIP-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW TOP BIDEN WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS COERCED BIG TECH TO CENSOR AMERICANS, TRUE INFORMATION, AND CRITICS OF THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION (Comm. Print May 1, 2024). More recently, Google Search’s autocomplete function suppressed information about the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt on President Donald Trump, and YouTube censored a video in which former FBI agent Marcus Allen, a Select Subcommittee witness, described his religious and political beliefs and prayed the rosary. See Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm on the Judiciary, to Sundar Pichai, CEO, Alphabet (Aug. 5, 2024); Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm on the Judiciary, to Sundar Pichai, CEO, Alphabet (Oct. 7, 2024). 297 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020. 1:39 p.m.), see Ex. 115.

• 69. 68 On October 15, 2020, a Facebook employee (and former FITF official) called Elvis Chan “as a follow up to the call with the Foreign Influence Task Force on 14 October.” 298 The Facebook employee reported back to his colleagues in an internal message thread that he “asked SSA Chan whether there was any update or change since the discussion . . . as to whether the FBI saw any evidence suggesting foreign sponsorship or direction of the leak of information related to Hunter Biden.” 299 Chan told the Facebook employee that he (Chan) was “up to speed” on what the FBI knew and “that there was no current evidence to suggest any foreign connection or direction of the leak.” 300 Chan assured the Facebook employee that he “would be in contact” if any additional information came to light.301 “SSA Chan advised that . . . there was no current evidence to suggest any foreign connection or direction of the leak” —Oct. 15, 2020, internal messages among Facebook personnel The same day, key Facebook decision-makers communicated about hearing “murmurs from the IC [intelligence community] substantiating the Burisma hack” and “the concern that this would be dumped in an October surprise.” 302 298 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 15, 2020), see Ex. 117. 299 Id. 300 Id. 301 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 15, 2020), see Ex. 117; see also Emails between Facebook personnel and FBI personnel (Oct. 15, 2020, 10:03 a.m.), Ex. 118; Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 15, 2020, 5:14 p.m.), Ex. 119. 302 Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 15, 2020, 8:56 a.m.), see Ex. 120.

• 70. 69 “FYI: starting to get stronger murmurs from the IC substantiating the Burisma hack” —Oct. 15, 2020, internal messages among Facebook personnel Three days later, on October 18, 2020, a Facebook employee reached out to the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF flagging a story furthering the false Russian hack-and-leak narrative, asking “does that change anything in your posture?” 303 The Russia Unit Chief asked for the Facebook employee to give him a call to discuss, still failing to reveal that the FBI possessed and had authenticated Hunter Biden’s laptop. 304 Facebook reached out to the FBI for additional information repeatedly. But rather than telling the companies that it was in possession of the laptop, the FBI repeatedly fed the platform its pre-approved message: “The FBI has nothing in its possession to suggest that the laptop is a hack or a leak.” 305 Of course, the FBI did not have information suggesting the laptop was a hack or a leak; to the contrary, the FBI possessed and had authenticated the laptop, so “at that time . . . knew . . . the laptop was not hacked.”306 The FBI was not the only government actor that tried to muddy the waters surrounding the provenance of the laptop—the intelligence community also tried to falsely paint this story as a Russian influence operation. On October 19, 2020, fifty-one former intelligence officials issued 303 Emails between FBI staff to Facebook employee (Oct. 18, 2020, 1:36 p.m.), see Ex. 121; see also Allison Quinn, Rudy’s ‘Russian Agent’ Pal Teases ‘Second Laptop’ With Hunter Biden Kompromat, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 18, 2020). 304 Id. 305 Transcribed Interview of the Russia Unit Chief of the FITF, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 2, 2024) (on file with Comm.) at 84. 306 Id. at 83-84.

• 71. 70 a statement falsely claiming that the Biden family influence peddling story bore all the hallmarks of a Russian influence operation.307 As the Committee has detailed in two reports coauthored with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the statement was a coordinated influence operation set in motion by a senior Biden campaign official, now-Secretary of State Antony Blinken. 308 High-level CIA officials—up to and potentially including then-Director Gina Haspel—were made aware of the statement before its publication.309 Companies asked repeatedly for more information about the laptop in the days following the Post article. The intelligence community colluded to falsely dismiss the story about Biden family influence peddling as Russian disinformation. And still, the FBI sat on the one fact that could have ended the confusion and set the record straight: the FBI was in possession of the laptop and had authenticated its contents. The FBI’s failure to do so ensured that platforms continued to censor—a potentially election-altering decision. 307 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AND H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 118TH CONG., THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 51: HOW CIA CONTRACTORS COLLUDED WITH THE BIDEN CAMPAIGN TO MISLEAD AMERICAN VOTERS (Comm. Print June 25, 2024); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AND H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 118TH CONG., THE HUNTER BIDEN STATEMENT: HOW SENIOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OFFICIALS AND THE BIDEN CAMPAIGN WORKED TO MISLEAD AMERICAN VOTERS (Comm. Print May 10, 2023); see also Brooke Singman, Biden campaign, Blinken orchestrated intel letter to discredit Hunter Biden laptop story, exCIA official says, FOX NEWS (Apr. 20, 2023). 308 Id. 309 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AND H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 118TH CONG., THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 51: HOW CIA CONTRACTORS COLLUDED WITH THE BIDEN CAMPAIGN TO MISLEAD AMERICAN VOTERS (Comm. Print June 25, 2024) at 2.

• 72. 71 IV. Epilogue: The fight against FBI election interference continues The FBI, through the FITF, engaged in a months-long campaign to influence the 2020 election by prebunking the story about Biden family influence peddling, as supported by material recovered from Hunter Biden’s laptop. In over thirty meetings with social media platforms before October 14, 2020, the FBI primed the Big Tech platforms for exactly what would happen: shortly before the election, an established media outlet would publish an article about documents implicating the Biden family and Burisma in a far-reaching influence peddling scheme. Then, when the Post published that very story, Big Tech did what the FBI had been priming them to do for months and censored the story. Since 2020, independent watchdogs have criticized the lack of protocol that allowed the FBI to successfully prebunk the true Post story. In July 2024, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice (DOJ OIG) found that the FITF operates in a “risky legal space” because social media companies may feel compelled to censor speech at its behest.310 In the same report, the DOJ OIG concluded that in 2020, the Justice Department and the FBI did not have adequate guardrails governing the FITF’s interactions with Big Tech: “neither the Department nor the FBI had a specific policy or guidance applicable to information sharing with social media companies.” 311 In January 2024, the FBI issued a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to govern its discussions with social media companies about content moderation and to formalize steps for sharing information with social media companies. 312 This SOP requires FBI personnel to include a lengthy disclaimer telling social media companies that “no adverse action will be taken by the FBI based on your company’s decision about whether or how to respond” to the FBI’s communications.313 FBI personnel also are not permitted to ask social media companies what actions have been taken in response to FBI communications. 314 The DOJ and FBI have refused to make the SOP publicly available and provide the American public with transparency into how the country’s most powerful law enforcement agency attempts to self-regulate its interactions with the companies hosting the modern town square.315 While this SOP marks an improvement over the previous protocol (or lack thereof), it does not allay the Committee’s concern that the FBI may be continuing to coerce platforms to censor content. Platforms undoubtedly remain aware of the FBI’s enforcement powers and retaliation capacity. As Stanford Internet Observatory Director Alex Stamos testified to the 310 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 24-080, EVALUATION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S EFFORTS TO COORDINATE INFORMATION SHARING ABOUT FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE THREATS TO U.S. ELECTIONS (July 2024), at 18. 311 Id. at 8. 312 Id. 313 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIV., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PROVIDING FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE THREAT INFORMATION TO SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS (STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE) (Jan. 2024), see Ex. 125. 314 Id. 315 Id.

• 73. 72 Committee, “you can’t have a casual chat with an FBI agent when you’re an executive at a company. It’s not safe.”316 The coordination meetings between the FBI and Big Tech stopped for a brief time after the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana issued, and a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit largely affirmed, a preliminary injunction against the DOJ and FBI that prohibited them from coercing or significantly encouraging social media companies to censor lawful content.317 This injunction prevented the FBI and various other federal agencies from having contact with Big Tech regarding the moderation of lawful content. Unfortunately, the same meetings that led to the prebunking of the laptop story in 2020 have resumed in 2024.318 After the Supreme Court stayed the lower courts’ injunction, 319 the FITF “resumed outreach” to social media companies sometime in early 2024. 320 According to an FBI spokesperson, the purpose of this outreach is “to facilitate sharing information about foreign malign influence with social media companies”—the same mandate that facilitated the FBI’s prebunking of the Post story.321 Given this past misconduct, it is concerning that the FBI is once again engaging in a similar manner with the entities responsible for administering the digital town square. During the course of its investigation, the Committee has issued subpoenas for documents to agencies and companies involved in the prebunking campaign, including the DOJ, the FBI, and major social media and technology platforms.322 Because the subpoenas are continuing in nature, they require these entities to turn over documents relating to the current, ongoing meetings on a rolling basis. As these meetings have occurred in 2024, the Committee and Select Subcommittee have begun to receive documents from many platforms and agencies. 323 These documents show that, 316 Transcribed Interview of Alex Stamos, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (June 23, 2023) (on file with Comm.) at 188. 317 Kevin Collier & Ken Dilanian, FBI Resumes Outreach to Social Media Companies Over Foreign Propaganda, NBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2024). 318 Id. 319 See Murthy v. Missouri, No. 23A243 (23-411), 601 U.S. __ , (Oct. 13, 2023) (granting application for stay); but see Murthy v. Missouri 601 U.S. __ (Oct. 20, 2023) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“At this time in the history of our country, what the Court has done, I fear, will be seen by some as giving the Government a green light to use heavyhanded tactics to skew the presentation of views on the medium that increasingly dominates the dissemination of news. That is most unfortunate.”). 320 Kevin Collier & Ken Dilanian, FBI Resumes Outreach to Social Media Companies Over Foreign Propaganda, NBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2024). 321 Id. 322 Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Hon. Merrick Garland, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 17, 2023) (attaching subpoena) (on file with Comm.); Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Hon. Jen Easterly, Dir., Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (Apr. 28, 2023) (attaching subpoena) (on file with Comm.); Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Meta (Feb. 15, 2023) (attaching subpoena) (on file with Comm.), Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Sundar Pichai, CEO, Alphabet (Feb. 15, 2023) (attaching subpoena) (on file with Comm.); Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Satya Nadella, CEO, Microsoft (Feb. 15, 2023) (attaching subpoena) (on file with Comm.). 323 See, e.g., Email from FBI staff to Facebook personnel (Apr. 24, 2024, 10:26 a.m.), Ex. 122.

• 74. 73 as in 2020, Elvis Chan remains the primary point of contact at the FBI for the meetings.324 They also show that the FBI, consistent with its new SOP, has added a more robust disclaimer at the end of its emails about the ostensibly voluntary nature of social media companies’ interactions with the FBI. 325 Previously, the FBI only sometimes included a disclaimer in its communications with Big Tech. 326 When it did so, the disclaimer was only two sentences long and stated that the information provided contained “neither the recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI” and that the contents were the property of the FBI and were not to be distributed.327 “This communication contains neither the recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. . . . it and its contents or attachments are not to be distributed outside your agency.” —Jan. 3, 2020, email from Elvis Chan to Google, showing the FBI’s disclaimer at the time 324 Id. 325 Id. 326 See Email from Elvis Chan to Google personnel (Jan. 6, 2020, 3:45 p.m.); Ex. 15. 327 Id.

• 75. 74 In the wake of the Committee’s and Select Subcommittee’s oversight, and increased public attention on the FBI’s censorship activities in 2020, the FBI appended a new disclaimer to its emails with Big Tech. The new disclaimer is twice as long and attempts to assure social media companies that they have “no obligation to respond or provide information back to FBI” in response to its outreach.328 “The FBI does not request or expect your company to take any particular action regarding this information other than holding it in confidence due to its sensitive nature.” —Apr. 24, 2024 email from FBI staff to Facebook personnel The disclaimer, by itself, does not sufficiently resolve the First Amendment implications created by federal law enforcement engaging with Big Tech. Social media platforms, like any company, have a strong incentive to comply with requests from the FBI given its enforcement powers.329 So long as the FBI continues to engage with the companies that provide and oversee 328 Email from FBI staff to Facebook personnel (April 24, 2024, 10:26 a.m.); see Ex. 122. 329 See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 24-080, EVALUATION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S EFFORTS TO COORDINATE INFORMATION SHARING ABOUT FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE THREATS TO U.S. ELECTIONS (July 2024).

• 76. 75 the digital town square, the risk of government infringement on Americans’ free expression will remain.330 * * * Documents and testimony obtained by the Committee and Select Subcommittee show the FBI’s interactions with Big Tech in the months, weeks, days, and hours leading up to and surrounding the publication of the New York Post’s explosive October 14, 2020 story about Biden family influence peddling. Internal documents from Big Tech in particular show a monthslong FBI campaign priming Big Tech companies to expect a Russian hack and leak about Hunter Biden and Burisma shortly before the election. When the true Post story matching the FBI’s warnings emerged, the Big Tech companies followed the FBI’s specific warnings and censored it, despite internal concerns that the story might not have been the product of a hack and leak. Even when it became clear the story was not Russian disinformation, Facebook and other platforms continued to censor the story out of concerns of how they may be viewed by a future Biden-Harris Administration. For a pivotal week, the most important story of the 2020 presidential election was censored. The Committee and Select Subcommittee will continue to conduct oversight of the FBI’s interactions with social media companies regarding content moderation. The modern town square must be free from direct and indirect government pressure. Government involvement will necessarily distort debate and lead to devastating policy outcomes.331 A prosperous and functioning democracy depends on free expression so that ideas and viewpoints succeed and fail on their merits. The First Amendment demands nothing less. 330 Id. 331 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY AND SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 118TH CONG., THE CENSORSHIP-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW TOP BIDEN WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS COERCED BIG TECH TO CENSOR AMERICANS, TRUE INFORMATION, AND CRITICS OF THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION (Comm. Print May 1, 2024).

• 77. 76 V. Appendix Table of Contents Exhibit 1: Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020) 83 Exhibit 2: Internal message from Facebook personnel to Nick Clegg (Oct. 15, 2020) 87 Exhibit 3: Microsoft internal meeting notes (Oct. 14, 2020) 89 Exhibit 4: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 91 Exhibit 5: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 99 Exhibit 6: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 102 Exhibit 7: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 104 Exhibit 8: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 117 Exhibit 9: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 119 Exhibit 10: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (July 15, 2020) 155 Exhibit 11: Statement from tech industry participants 157 Exhibit 12: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Aug. 5, 2020) 159 Exhibit 13: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 20, 2020) 166 Exhibit 14: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 13, 2020) 169 Exhibit 15: Emails between Google personnel and FBI staff (Jan. 6, 2020) 173 Exhibit 16: Internal emails among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 176 Exhibit 17: Email from FBI Counsel to Google personnel (Jan. 31, 2020) 180 Exhibit 18: Emails between FBI and Microsoft personnel (Jan. 9, 2020) 182 Exhibit 19: Email between Elvis Chan and Yahoo personnel (Feb. 12, 2020) 185 Exhibit 20: Email between Elvis Chan and Yahoo personnel (Apr. 13, 2020) 188 Exhibit 21: Emails between Elvis Chan and Google personnel (Apr. 14, 2020) 191

• 78. 77 Exhibit 22: Scheduling emails between FBI and Facebook personnel (May 12, 2020) 193 Exhibit 23: Emails between Elvis Chan and Yahoo personnel (May 18, 2020) 195 Exhibit 24: Scheduling emails between LinkedIn and FBI personnel (May 20, 2020) 197 Exhibit 25: Emails between Elvis Chan and Yahoo personnel (July 14, 2020) 200 Exhibit 26: Emails between Elvis Chan and Google personnel (July 14, 2020) 204 Exhibit 27: Emails between Elvis Chan and Google personnel (July 14, 2020) 208 Exhibit 28: Emails between Elvis Chan and Yahoo personnel (July 24, 2020) 211 Exhibit 29: Scheduling emails between FBI and Facebook personnel (Aug. 10, 2020) 215 Exhibit 30: Emails between FBI and Facebook personnel about FITF meeting attendees (Aug. 11, 2020) 219 Exhibit 31: Scheduling emails between LinkedIn and FBI personnel (July 14 – Aug. 12, 2020) 224 Exhibit 32: Emails between Elvis Chan and LinkedIn personnel (Sept. 10, 2020) 227 Exhibit 33: Emails between Elvis Chan and Google personnel (Sept. 10-11, 2020) 231 Exhibit 34: Emails between Elvis Chan and Yahoo personnel (Sept. 14, 2020) 234 Exhibit 35: Emails between Elvis Chan and Google personnel (Sept. 18, 2020) 238 Exhibit 36: Scheduling emails between FBI and Facebook personnel (Sept. 10-21, 2020) 240 Exhibit 37: Scheduling emails between Elvis Chan and LinkedIn personnel (Sept. 10-22, 2020) 246 Exhibit 38: Emails between Elvis Chan and Yahoo personnel (Sept. 24, 2020) 250 Exhibit 39: Emails between Elvis Chan and Google personnel (Sept. 29, 2020) 254 Exhibit 40: Emails between Elvis Chan and Google personnel (Sept. 29 – Oct. 14, 2020) 257 Exhibit 41: Emails between Elvis Chan and LinkedIn personnel (Sept. 29 – Oct. 13, 2020) 260

• 79. 78 Exhibit 42: Emails from FBI to Big Tech participants scheduling FITF Bilateral meetings (Oct. 2020) 263 Exhibit 43: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 329 Exhibit 44: Internal FBI meeting summary notes from Twitter-FITF meeting (Oct. 14, 2020) 333 Exhibit 45: Emails between Google personnel and FBI staff (Apr. 20, 2020) 358 Exhibit 46: Emails between Brian Scully and industry participants (May 11-12, 2020) 361 Exhibit 47: Scheduling emails from Facebook personnel to industry group (May 13, 2020) 366 Exhibit 48: Internal Facebook readout of USG-Industry meeting (May 14, 2020) 368 Exhibit 49: Agenda emails between industry participants (June 9, 2020) 370 Exhibit 50: Scheduling email from Facebook personnel to industry group (June 9, 2020) 373 Exhibit 51: Scheduling email from Google personnel to industry group (June 10, 2020) 377 Exhibit 52: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (June 30, 2020) 379 Exhibit 53: Internal Facebook readout of the USG-Industry meeting (June 10, 2020) 382 Exhibit 54: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (July 1, 2020) 384 Exhibit 55: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (July 10, 2020) 386 Exhibit 56: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 388 Exhibit 57: Scheduling email from Google personnel to industry group (July 15, 2020) 394 Exhibit 58: Internal Facebook readout of the USG-Industry meeting (July 17, 2020) 396 Exhibit 59: Scheduling email from Google personnel to industry group (Aug. 12, 2020) 398 Exhibit 60: Internal Facebook readout of the USG-Industry meeting (Aug. 13, 2020) 400 Exhibit 61: Agenda emails between industry participants (Sept. 11, 2020) 408 Exhibit 62: Scheduling email from Facebook personnel to industry group (Sept. 11, 2020) 411

• 80. 79 Exhibit 63: Agenda emails between CISA and Facebook personnel (Sept. 1-15, 2020) 413 Exhibit 64: Scheduling email from Google personnel to industry group (Sept. 16, 2020) 418 Exhibit 65: Internal Facebook notes about USG-Industry meeting (Sept. 16, 2020) 420 Exhibit 66: Agenda email between CISA and Facebook personnel (Sept. 9, 2020) 424 Exhibit 67: Agenda emails between CISA and Facebook personnel (Sept. 29 – Oct. 5, 2020) 426 Exhibit 68: Scheduling email from Facebook personnel to industry group (Oct. 7, 2020) 429 Exhibit 69: Emails between Elvis Chan and Reddit personnel (Sept. 29, 2020) 431 Exhibit 70: Emails between Elvis Chan and Yahoo personnel (Sept. 29, 2020) 434 Exhibit 71: USG-Industry meeting invitation (July 8, 2020) 438 Exhibit 72: USG-Industry meeting invitation (Sept. 9, 2020) 440 Exhibit 73: USG-Industry meeting invitation (Oct. 21, 2020) 443 Exhibit 74: USG-Industry meeting invitation (Oct. 28, 2020) 447 Exhibit 75: Internal Facebook emails between Mark Zuckerberg, Sheryl Sandberg, and Facebook personnel (Oct. 5, 2020) 451 Exhibit 76: USG-Industry meeting agenda (July 14, 2020) 454 Exhibit 77: USG-Industry meeting invitation (July 14, 2020) 457 Exhibit 78: Internal Facebook readout of USG-Industry meeting (Sept. 17, 2020) 461 Exhibit 79: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 463 Exhibit 80: Internal Facebook readout of USG-Industry meeting (Oct. 8, 2020) 465 Exhibit 81: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 9, 2020) 467 Exhibit 82: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 18, 2020) 475 Exhibit 83: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 21, 2020) 479 Exhibit 84: Emails between Google personnel and Democratic National Committee staff (Aug. 5, 2020) 485

• 81. 80 Exhibit 85: Emails between Facebook personnel and DNI staff (Sept. 24, 2020) 488 Exhibit 86: Aspen Digital Hack-and-leak Roundtable agenda (June 25, 2020) 491 Exhibit 87: Aspen Digital Hack-and-leak Roundtable meeting readout (July 2, 2020) 493 Exhibit 88: Memo from Aspen Institute roundtable 495 Exhibit 89: Emails from Aspen Institute staff to industry participants (July 14, 2020) 499 Exhibit 90: Emails from Aspen Institute staff to industry participants (June 22, 2020) 501 Exhibit 91: Emails between Aspen Institute and Facebook personnel (May 6-19, 2020) 504 Exhibit 92: Emails between Aspen Institute, Facebook, and Stanford personnel (June 15-25, 2020) 507 Exhibit 93: Emails between Aspen Institute and Facebook personnel (July 13, 2020) 513 Exhibit 94: Email from Aspen Institute personnel to Facebook personnel (Sept. 28, 2020) 516 Exhibit 95: Aspen Digital Hack-and-leak Roundtable participant list (June 25, 2020) 518 Exhibit 96: Email from Aspen Institute staff to industry participants (Aug. 2, 2020) 521 Exhibit 97: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Sept. 20, 2020) 523 Exhibit 98: Email from Aspen Institute personnel to Facebook and Twitter personnel (Aug. 7, 2020) 528 Exhibit 99: Emails from Aspen Digital staff to Roundtable participants (Aug. 12 – Sept. 1, 2020) 530 Exhibit 100: Aspen Digital Hack-and-Dump Scenario Outline (Sept. 2020) 533 Exhibit 101: Messages between Nick Clegg and Joel Kaplan (Oct. 14, 2020) 538 Exhibit 102: Internal Facebook Hack/Leak Policy Assessment (Oct. 20, 2020) 542 Exhibit 103: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 553 Exhibit 104: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 555 Exhibit 105: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 557

• 82. 81 Exhibit 106: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 560 Exhibit 107: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 562 Exhibit 108: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 568 Exhibit 109: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 578 Exhibit 110: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 580 Exhibit 111: Internal email between Facebook employees (Oct. 14, 2020) 583 Exhibit 112: Email from Elvis Chan to Google personnel (Jan. 3, 2020) 585 Exhibit 113: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 587 Exhibit 114: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 594 Exhibit 115: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 596 Exhibit 116: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 601 Exhibit 117: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 14, 2020) 606 Exhibit 118: Emails between Facebook personnel and FBI personnel (Oct. 15, 2020) 610 Exhibit 119: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 15, 2020) 612 Exhibit 120: Internal messages among Facebook personnel (Oct. 15, 2020) 618 Exhibit 121: Email from FBI staff to Facebook employee (Oct. 18, 2020) 620 Exhibit 122: Email from FBI staff to Facebook personnel (April 24, 2024) 622 Exhibit 123: Email between Atlantic Council personnel (July 20-31, 2020) 625 Exhibit 124: Emails among tech industry participants (Sept. 15, 2020)…………………...629 Exhibit 125: FBI Standard Operating Procedure: Providing Foreign Malign Influence Threat Information to Social Media Platforms (2024) 633