Lessons from the Columbia Disaster
Lessons from the Columbia Disaster
Lessons from the Columbia Disaster
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Columbia Disaster
Robiel Ghebrekidan
SYSM 6309: Advanced Requirements Engineering Summer 2013
6/22/2013
- 1. Overview
- 2. Cause of the Failure
- 3. Corrective Action
- 4. Requirement Issues
- · Space shuttle Columbia, re-entering Earth's atmosphere at 10,000 mph, disintegrates
- · As a result:
- - All 7 astronauts are killed
- - $4 billion spacecraft is destroyed
- - Debris scattered over 2000 sq-miles of Texas
- - NASA grounds shuttle fleet for 2-1/2 years
- · Insulating foam separates from external tank 81 seconds after lift-off
- · Foam strikes underside of left wing, breaches thermal protection system (TPS) tiles
- · Superheated air enters wing during re-entry, melting aluminum struts
- · Aerodynamic stresses destroy weakened wing
- · Many times chunks of insulating foam broke off at launch and dinged the thermal protection system
- · NASA had observed it so many times on orbiters that did return safely, they didn't consider it a serious problem
- · Foam strike detected in launch videos on Day 2
- · Engineers requested inspection by crew or remote photo imagery to check for damage
- · Mission managers discounted foam strike significance
- · No actions were taken to confirm shuttle integrity or prepare contingency plans
- · January 28, 1986, the shuttle Challenger explodes 73 seconds into its launch, killing all seven crew members
- Forward · Investigation reveals that a solid rocket booster (SRB) joint failed, allowing flames to impinge on the external fuel tank
- · Liquid hydrogen tank explodes, ruptures liquid oxygen tank
- · Resulting massive explosion destroys the shuttle
- · NASA created a contingency plans to launch a rescue for future mission
- · Released a report outlining what it had learned from the Columbia accident with regard to crew safety and survivability for future spaceflight.
- - Both disasters happened because of both physical and human factors.
- - Each successful mission reinforced the perception that foam shedding was unavoidableâ¦either unlikely to jeopardize safety or an acceptable risk.
- - Foam shedding, which violated the shuttle design basis, had been normalized
Table of Contents
Columbia Disaster
Cause of Failure
Cause of Failure
Cause of Failure
Earlier Shuttles
Earlier Shuttles
Corrective Actions
Requirement Issue
Bibliography
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaster
http://www.space.com/19436-columbia-disaster.html
Questions
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