EconoFACTSMarch 04, 2025 | 09:35Trade War Impact: Take Two

EconoFACTSMarch 04, 2025 | 09:35Trade War Impact: Take Two

• 1. EconoFACTS March 04, 2025 | 09:35 Trade War Impact: Take Two Quick Search Economist Related Research Overview U.S. President Trump’s executive order imposing a 25% tari on all non-energy imports from Canada and a 10% tari on energy imports is now eective (March 4). Separately, a 25% tari was levied on all imports from Mexico and an additional 10% tari was put on all imports from China. These rates are in addition to any taris or duties already charged. The President invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to apply these taris. After declaring a national emergency at the southern border due to “the inux of illegal aliens and illicit drugs”, the President expanded this to cover “the public health crisis of deaths due to the use of fentanyl and other illicit drugs”. And, specically, “the failure of Canada to do more to arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise intercept DTOs [drug tracking organizations], other drug and human trackers, criminals at large, and drugs”. However, in yesterday’s announcement that taris were indeed proceeding, the President suggested that auto plants and others should relocate production to the U.S. to avoid taris, revealing the true rationale behind the measures. The original executive order also said: “Should Canada retaliate… the President may increase or expand in scope the duties imposed under this order”. Canada has announced 25% retaliatory taris on C$155 bln worth of imports from the U.S.: $30 bln eective March 4 and the remaining $125 bln after 21 days. Several provinces have also announced or are planning non-tari measures. It’s uncertain whether: 1) the U.S. will retaliate for Canada’s retaliation; 2) the Administration will heed the calls from U.S. businesses for exemptions; and 3) if the executive order will survive legal challenges. However, by April 1, there will be three reports delivered to the President (under the America First Trade Policy memorandum) that should be full of tari recommendations backed by investigations (or soon-to-be), setting the stage for more Section 201 (safeguard), Section 232 (national security) and Section 301 (unfair trade practices) taris. In consequence, taris on Canada and other countries could be around for a while, and could go potentially higher. In fact, ‘reciprocal’ taris or industry-specic taris may be ‘stackable’ on top of the initial 25% levy. Given this backdrop, we are adjusting our forecasts, as outlined below. This is clearly a uid situation, and further adjustments may be required in the weeks ahead, as more information comes to light in terms of Canada’s scal response, as well as any potential U.S. countermeasures, or even a possible o-ramp for the taris. For now, we are incorporating the information on hand, and assuming that the taris will be in place for a year. The main dierences from our initial take a month ago are: a) the Canadian economy’s starting point was stronger than expected, including solid GDP growth around the turn of the year and sturdy job growth at the start of 2025, and b) the U.S. economy was softer than expected in early 2025, as sentiment was clearly souring through February. + 3/6/25, 1:09 PM Trade War Impact: Take Two https://economics.bmo.com/en/publications/detail/d052c9b7-4aac-4563-899a-97bfc3172a9d/ 1/5

• 2. Economic Impact on Canada ... Trump’s tari hammer will come down hard on Canada’s economy. If the announced taris remain in place for one year, the economy would face the risk of a moderate recession. A couple quarters of contraction are well within the realm of possibility. With little condence given the lack of historical precedent, we estimate that the taris will reduce real GDP growth by roughly 1.5 ppts to around 0.5% in 2025. This reects reduced demand for Canadian exports to the U.S. (which account for about a fth of GDP), disrupted supply chains impeding business activity and consumption, and heightened uncertainty that reduces business investment. It also reects a reduction in domestic demand due to higher prices stemming from retaliatory taris and a weaker Canadian dollar. The estimated growth hit is a bit lighter than the Bank of Canada’s recent scenario (it called for about a 2.5 ppts reduction in GDP growth for the rst year), due to the lesser 10% tari on energy products, as well as the fact that Canada’s retaliation is measured. However, we recognize the diculty in modelling such an extreme event, and certain sectors may not behave in a predictable or linear pattern—e.g., the highly integrated auto industry. CPI ination is expected to rise less than one ppt this year from the current 1.9% rate in January. But given growing slack in the economy and a likely more-than-one ppt increase in the unemployment rate to around 8%, ination pressures should remain subdued, allowing for some moderation in 2026. Partly limiting the economic pain will be a weaker currency, lower interest rates, and an expected government relief program for jobless workers and aected businesses. These supports, along with the assumed revoking of taris after one year, should lead to a modest recovery in 2026, with average growth still close to 0.5% next year. From a sectoral lens, a wide range of Canadian industries derive at least half of their revenue from U.S. exports. Near the top of the list is motor vehicles, but others with high exposure include auto parts, clothing, wood products, chemicals, medicines, rubber, iron and steel, aluminum, machinery, computers, and electrical equipment. In agriculture, tobacco, greenhouses, sugar, and seafood stand out. While the oil industry has very high exposure, we assume the 10% tari will have little dampening eect given a combination of a weaker loonie, Canadian producer price cuts, and U.S. renery cost absorption. The housing market recovery in Canada, as gradual as we expected it to be in the absence of taris, could be dampened this year by the condence-sapping trade war, before resuming in 2026 on lower mortgage rates. The President could increase taris further in response to retaliatory actions or on specic industries (steel, aluminum, copper, lumber, and autos), which would raise the risk of a deeper economic downturn. The potential long-term damage to Canada’s economy cannot be dismissed, either. Many businesses will increase production on the other side of the border to avoid taris. The uncertainty alone about further protectionism could put a chill on business investment for years, which is why the government’s response should also be directed at encouraging productivity-enhancing investment. This was already a necessity before taris given the new U.S. administration’s planned probusiness policies, including corporate tax cuts and lighter regulations. ... and the Provinces Direct exposure to U.S. trade varies across the country, and so will the impact. B.C. carries a relatively low share of goods exports in its economy, and roughly half of those are destined for markets outside the U.S, but some industries (e.g., forestry) will come under duress. Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland, because of hefty energy exports, carry the largest exposure (exports to the U.S. are 20%-to-35% of GDP); but, the lighter 10% tari on such products, and the assumption that a portion will be passed to the U.S. consumer, leaves the impact to run smaller in these provinces—at least in the short run. Non-energy U.S. export exposure is highest throughout Central Canada. In Ontario, for example, U.S. goods exports top 17% of GDP with a wide range of industries exposed (e.g., autos, machinery, metals and consumer goods). Quebec’s industrial metals and manufactured goods will be vulnerable, as will Manitoba’s diverse manufacturing base. Atlantic Canada is susceptible because of a few highly-concentrated industries, even if the broad economic impact appears smaller—think the Newfoundland & Labrador shery, and PEI packaged food goods. All told, we expect the economic impact to hit hardest in Ontario and the rest of Central Canada; signicantly impacting some concentrated industries in Atlantic Canada and B.C., while dealing a lesser immediate blow in oil-producing provinces. 3/6/25, 1:09 PM Trade War Impact: Take Two https://economics.bmo.com/en/publications/detail/d052c9b7-4aac-4563-899a-97bfc3172a9d/ 2/5

• 3. Rates and the CAD The Bank of Canada’s rate cut in late January was partly portrayed as a risk management move compelled by the rising risk of U.S. taris. With that risk now being realized, we reckon the Bank will lean against the expected signicant economic slowdown and steeply escalating risk of recession along with associated disinationary pressures. However, there will be a measure of caution in the policy easing, with inationary pressures simultaneously prodded by retaliatory taris and Canadian dollar depreciation. Previously, we projected the Bank would cut the policy rate two more times this cycle, by 25 bps in April and July (ending at 2.50%). We now look for the quarter-point pace to continue in each of the next four meetings until July, taking the rate to 2.0%. The net risk is that we eventually go even lower, if the Bank is comfortable with the prevailing ination backdrop later this year. The Fed is expected to stay on the sidelines for a number of FOMC meetings and then resume a quarterly 25-bp rate cut clip in September, albeit with risks of an earlier move should the economy lose more momentum. This means Canada-U.S. overnight rate spreads are going to widen even further, testing the -225 bps level. With medium- and long-term Canada-U.S. bond yield spreads smashing through record negative levels earlier this year and remaining wide, the market has been sensing extreme overnight spreads too. This will no doubt add to the Canadian dollar’s woes along with rmness in the greenback as America’s taris go global. We see the loonie averaging around C$1.49 by this autumn and can’t rule out a run above the C$1.50 level, with the net risk this could occur quicker. Economic Impact on the U.S. Unfortunately, the taris announced on Canada, Mexico, and China proved as broad-based and comprehensive as we feared (approximately 43% of all U.S. goods imports). This will likely cause near-immediate supply chain disruptions in a number of industries (motor vehicles and parts the most obvious sector to watch), shortages of some products in stores, and a near-term price spike for many imported goods from America’s three largest trading partners. We also expect an upswing in nancial market volatility as market pricing resets to the newly evolving macroeconomic landscape, and increased policy uncertainty. Incorporating the U.S. tari increases and retaliation from Canada and Mexico announced so far, and assuming these higher taris remain in place a full year, we are marking down our baseline U.S. GDP growth forecast for full-year 2025 by 0.4 ppts to 1.8% and the 2026 call by 0.2 ppts to 1.8%, while lifting our core PCE ination estimates by 0.4 ppts in 2025 to 3.0% and by 0.3 ppts in 2026 to 2.7%. On a Q4/Q4 basis for 2025, we see growth at 1.4%, down from 2.0% previously, and core PCE ination at a higher 3.2% instead of 2.5%. Note, these forecast changes are preliminary and could move considerably in the weeks and months ahead due to nancial market behaviour, as well as monetary and scal reactions, and if the new taris prove shorter-lived than assumed, or additional taris and retaliations are announced. Should the U.S. administration broaden the trade war to other nations, including much of Europe, as it has threatened, the economic harm will escalate, and we will need to revisit our forecast. On the other hand, a possible early withdrawal of taris would set the U.S. economy back on course for another solid year of growth. 3/6/25, 1:09 PM Trade War Impact: Take Two https://economics.bmo.com/en/publications/detail/d052c9b7-4aac-4563-899a-97bfc3172a9d/ 3/5

• 4. Looking Ahead... While the tari situation remains as uid as ever, there are a few key dates we’re circling in the weeks ahead: March 12: 25% on all U.S. imports of steel and aluminum (regardless of country of origin) April 1: President Trump receives three reports that will likely recommend taris based on Section 201 (safeguard), Section 232 (national security) and Section 301 (unfair trade practices) April 2: the date highlighted by President Trump for potential reciprocal taris as well as potential levies on lumber, autos, pharmaceuticals, ships, and semiconductors Note that Canada will have a new Prime Minister after the Liberal leadership vote this Sunday (March 9). Parliament resumes on March 24 with a general election expected to be called soon. Please see our previous research on the taris: Tari Gridlock: Cost and Chaos in the Auto Industry (Focus, February 28, 2025) Trade War Impact: First Pass (EconoFACTS, February 2) The ‘America First Trade Policy’ Plan (Focus, January 31) Canada’s All-Important Tari Policy Response (Focus, January 31) Will Canadian Energy Get Drilled? (Focus, January 24) Ten Tari Truths (Focus, January 17) 25% Taris: What If? (Focus, December 6, 2024) Disclosures You might also be interested in 03/06/2025 EconoFACTS How Does the ECB Describe Policy? "Meaningfully Less Restrictive" Jennifer Lee 03/06/2025 EconoFACTS Tales from the Trade Tape Shelly Kaushik 03/05/2025 EconoFACTS Fed's Beige Book Highlights Tari Concerns Priscilla Thiagamoorthy 03/05/2025 EconoFACTS U.S. ISM Services: Better But Not Tari-ic Sal Guatieri 03/05/2025 EconoFACTS Spotlight on Productivity Shelly Kaushik Legal Client BMO 3/6/25, 1:09 PM Trade War Impact: Take Two https://economics.bmo.com/en/publications/detail/d052c9b7-4aac-4563-899a-97bfc3172a9d/ 4/5

• 5. 3/6/25, 1:09 PM Trade War Impact: Take Two https://economics.bmo.com/en/publications/detail/d052c9b7-4aac-4563-899a-97bfc3172a9d/ 5/5